INDIA: NUCLEAR-CHEMICAL-BIOLOGICAL THEFTS OR SMUGGLING
Saman Malik
5/19/2009

The international media remains toujours preoccupied with fears of NCB-material thefts from Pakistan’s installations. There are some feeble voices, like that of US Congressman Ed Markey who, nevertheless, occasionally expresses concern at fragile security of India’s WMD materials and technology. Markey considers that India’s installations are very porous and offer scope for theft, and by corollary, proliferation.

Concern about India is corroborated by her historical record. Let us have a bird’s-eye view of a few incidents. Four containers of phosphorous penta – sulphide were detained by Sri-Lankan authorities at Colombo Port, en-route Bombay to Israel (1994). These containers contained ingredients for manufacture of a deadly nerve gas. In 1989, India publicly confirmed that Yellowcake was being smuggled from Jaduguda Uranium mines in the Singhbhum region of southern Bihar to Nepal. Yellowcakes are manufactured from Uranium powder that could be converted into radiological-dispersal devices, commonly known as dirty bombs. The notorious smuggler, Maheshwar Deo Singh was caught by Indian police and 1.8 kg of Uranium was recovered from his possession in 1989. In the Uranium market of Kathmandu, one kg of Jaduguda Uranium costs Rs 1 crore. On being interrogated, Deo confessed that his network of couriers have been carrying on the `businesss’ for the past several years. He disclosed that a courier gets the minimum of Indian Rs 25,000 for successfully carrying a consignment from Jaduguda to various dumping centres in Bihar and West Bengal. From there the inter-country `dealers’ smuggled Uranium to Katmandu.
In 1990/1991, two shiploads, containing Nuclear Biological and Chemical (NBC) materials from India were on their way to Syria, but the vessels were called back. However, later in 1992, India succeeded to deliver such consignments to Syria. India supplied thiodyglycol and some other chemicals to Iran in 1992. Again in 1993, the United Phosphorous Ltd of India supplied 30 tonnes of trimethyl – phosphate to Iran. During November- December 1993, India made an abortive attempt to ship chemicals to Iraq through Jordan. The shipment embarked from Madras Port. The information about this shipment was received by American Government, which protested to Jordan and the ship was turned back. In 1994, four containers of phosphorous penta – sulphide were detained by Sri-Lankan authorities at Colombo Port, en-route Bombay to Israel. The consignment contained ingredients for manufacturing a deadly nerve gas.
Three persons, with eight kilograms of Uranium were arrested by India’s Central Bureau of Investigation in Tamil Nadu in July 1998. The stolen material contained six kilograms of natural Uranium. The contraband was sent to Indira Gandhi Centre for Atomic Research for analysis. It confirmed that the recovered material contained Uranium 235 and 238. On 31 July 1998, two engineers were arrested by police. They were carrying 2.31 kilograms of Uranium from. From the samples, 1.40 percent and 2.20 percent of enriched uranium was extracted, confirming that the recovered Uranium was neither an ore, nor a depleted compound. Mumbai Police seized 8.3 kilograms of uranium, confirmed by Bhaba Atomic Research Centre to be radioactive, on May 1, 2000.
In 1994, a shipment of beryllium and other material worth over US $ 24 million, useful for making an H-bomb, was caught in Vilnius. This catch confirmed the late 1980s CIA assessment that India was trying to develop a Hydrogen bomb.
Let us quote a few more incidents. An Indian national, Sitaram Rai Mahadevan, having Canadian citizenship and permanently residing in the USA, was arrested in October 2003 for sending blueprints of specialized nuclear valves to North Korea. Twenty-five kilograms of radioactive uranium were recovered from smugglers on November 5, 2000, and fifty-seven pounds of uranium on November 7, 2000. On 13 Nov 2000, three uranium rods were recovered from smugglers, according to an IAEA report. On August 27, 2001 West Bengal police arrested two men with more than 200 grams of semi-processed uranium. Radioactive Cobalt-60 rods were stolen from the Tata Steel factory in Jamshedpur on August 15, 2003. Seven hundred and fifty kilograms of Uranium was stolen during transportation from Jadugora Uranium Mines (Bihar) to Hyderabad in January 1999.
Delhi based M/S NEC Engineers Private Limited shipped 10 consignments of prohibited material, worth $ 791,343, to Iraq between September 1998 and February 2001. The exports included titanium vessels, spherical aluminum powder, titanium centrifugal pumps and industrial cells with platinum anodes that can be used in the manufacture of rocket propellant. Protech Consultant Private Limited supplied NBC-weapons-related material to Iraq as well as Iran. This shipment violated USA-imposed sanctions on NEC Engineers and Protech Consultant Private Limited of India. Taiwanese customs authorities recovered 1,000 tons of Aluminum Oxide from a North Korean container ship in August 2003. The Aluminum Oxide found aboard the ship had been manufactured in India. The substance when mixed with other materials could be used for making shells. Twenty-nine Titanium Alloy Rings, worth Indian Rs 22.50 lakh, used in rocket engine were stolen from the highly-guarded Liquid Propulsion Systems Centre in Bangalore (February 6-12, 2004). Two persons, Khurshid and Aslam, were arrested by Bareilly Police with 254 grams of weapon-grade Uranium.
That‘s not all. Akhtar Hussain Qutbuddin Ahmed, an Indian businessman working in Dubai was deported on 12 June 2004, on charges of trying to sell India’s nuclear secrets to various diplomatic missions. He was accused of offering nuclear secrets which he had acquired from his brother who was working as a senior scientist at Bhabha Atomic Research Centre (BARC). He was interrogated by police and security agencies for over 40 hours and later handed over to India, on arrival he was arrested at Mumbai airport.

An Indian national Sitaram Rai Mahadevan, having Canadian citizenship and permanently residing in USA, was arrested in October 2003 for allegedly sending blueprints of specialized valves, a critical part for nuclear plants to North Korea. On 30 September 2004, US State Department announced imposition of sanctions against two Indian nuclear scientists; Dr C Surrender and Dr. Y S R Prasad for transferring unconventional weapons and missile technology to Iran.
On 23 March 2007 US Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) arrested two Indian citizens Parthasarathy Sudarshan and Mythili Gopal in South Carolina, USA. They were involved in smuggling to India US-made electronic components for use in missile-guidance system.
The above incidents are only tip of the iceberg. Indians even advertised on websites dual-use (nuclear) equipment. It is unfortunate that the world community seldom shifts its focus, away from Pakistan, to India.

The covert arm of CIA can even cause a major/minor explosion or sabotage some Indian reactors so that they can prove that Indian nukes are not safe enough just like Pakistan’s.Even they can encourage the ISI to carry out a 26/11 type of operation against one of those coastal reactors. A loss of few thousand Indian lives for the sake of elimination of Indian nukes is a cold blooded option for the new Obama administration about which Indian security establishment must be continuously on guard.
The Pakistanies are telling Obama that
1.We have killed 10,000 fellow Muslim Palestinians in Jordan for the sake of the King Hussein who was your asset.
2.We have trained and sent our Army along with Taliban to fight the Russians which resulted in the destruction of Soviet Union.
3.We have given you access to China through Kissinger.
4.For the sake of one mistake by a section of alquaeda in Afghanistan during 9/11(which a section of our Army believes to be a Jewish operation), the US has allowed the Taliban to be defeated and Northern alliance to take over .
We have paid for that mistake enough and your 15 billion dollars for the recent operation we are doing for you is just peanuts.We want Kashmir and also Siachen and also a regime which is pliable in Afghanistan. We want Heketmayer in place of Karzai if Mullah Omar could not be accommodated. Saudies are with us in these demands as can be seen their connivance in Benazir killing.
Pakistan’s greatest gambit is that it will sign the NPT/CBDT once India signs it because Pakistan knows that India will never sign it.Obama is so obsessed with placating Muslim nations that he even bowed before Dictator Saudi King, a thing never done by any President of America.
Bow of Obama http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=YajKGqXQBdc
The American lobby with its Big business Indian clients has ensured before the election that Ms.Sonia Gandhi will not have an option of selecting the Prime Minister of India. The Nehru/Gandhi family always did have this option from the time of independence. But today it has to succumb to the selection of ManMohan singh who is from Rajya Sabha. The Hindutva forces were actually helping this section of Indian national congress and weakening the hold of Ms.Sonia Gandhi as they feel she is of foreign origin.The patriotism of Indians is mainly according to the faith of the Indians according to them. A myopic view.Now they have started pointing their arrows at Rahul and Priyanka Vadhra by using some obscure citizenship laws.

This American lobby can even use our Defence forces for their ends is well known as they have used them in Pakistan,Middleast,Japan etc etc.Our forces can be subverted in the guise of Seminars and foreign jaunts like any other Indian civil bureaucrat must have opened their eyes during the joint Military exercises.The top brass in any third world country falls for the view “Defense brass must have a say in making of foreign policy of a country” just like in Pakistan,Philipines,Thailand etc etc

Indian civil society must be on guard against various machinations of Hyper powers. It is not only USA but Soviet Union,China,UK,France have a vested interest in not allowing any new entrant into Permanent Five of the Security council as can be seen in their ganging up against North Korea,Iran , Pakistan and India except Israel which has kept its deterrence in ambiguity.The entry pass to P5 is of course are the nukes.

Again HAWALA in Afghanistan is controlled by poppy induced illegal money. One finds the hawala centers are the same which also produce illegal opium. Helmand is the Hqtrs of both Illegal opium and hawala trade.The drug and hawala route are also same.
1.Helmand- Pakistan- Iran
2.Herat-Iran
3.Faizabad(Badsha Khan province-Tajikistan-Pakistan-China.
93% of World’s Illegal opium is grown in Afghanistan.Out of which 70% is grown in Helmand.Again a small border town in Helmand bordering Pakistan  called  Baramcha is the focal point of all the illegal trade in opium and Hawala.The world’s intelligence agencies have their meeting point in this small but prosperous town.
The total economy of Afghanistan is 7.8 Billion US dollars. While illegal opium trade is more than 5 Billion US dollars!!!Now one can understand how important is drug trade is to Afghanistan and also to Jihadies and also to ISI.

TALIBAN  just impose a small 10% of tax on opium produced in areas which they control and one can easily imagine the money they control and why Pakistan is crying hoarse about the recent drone attacks. When one sees that Pakistan as a nation got only 4.5 billion  US dollars from IMF, the money which Taliban/ISI axis are controlling in Afghanistan is mind blogging. But USA must be aware of this and allowed it.   UK is in contrary policy option is due to their posting in Helmand where 2 para of UK just provide security to poppy crops of Afghan farmers for some consideration must be.!!!UK is the nation which indulged in opium war with China during 18th century.It knows how to make profit in every situation. UK is growing recently poppy at DIDCOT county in UK. Macfarlan Smith a pharma company is given the license to produce the poppy. Of course our foreign policy mandarins knew anything about this poppy /pharma connection in UK is antibody’s guess because they were surprised at Millibands outburst. Canada is another country which is facing the problem of seduction of Drug money on its soldiers and CONTRACTORS like Compass Integrated Security solutions who are even blamed for death of a Canadian soldier.
Taliban are able to completely ignore or reduce taxes on non/opium trade in the area they control as long as one pays 10% tax on the opium produced and thereby winning the hearts and minds of ordinary farmers. So a reduction in cultivation will force them to increase the non/poppy tax base. Increase in opium production is a sort of vested interest created in Taliban by US and ISI through their drug lords. But Taliban have been very clever .They have built a significant buffer stock of the crop and so any reduction in cultivated area will only add to the price increase , which they can exploit.
Saudi funding for insurgency has significantly reduced to TALIBAN who have no ISI connection.So it is Drug money which is actually fuelling the insurgency and economy of Afghanistan and also FATA/WAZIRSTAN.Then what is the game plan of
Obama administration in inviting the following for his inauguration.
1.Gul Agha Sherzai
2.Dr.Ashraff Ghani Ahmedzai
3.Ali Ahmed Jalali
4.Abudullah Abdullah, ex foreign minister from northern alliance.
He is trying to do what President Reagan did by inviting Gulbudin Heketmayer to his ranch even though he was known as the warlord who threw acid on faces of Kabul university girls.Why he is trying to replace Karzai with one of these war lords? These guys are not angels.The reason is DRUG TRADE AND DRUG MONEY which made even Zilmay Khalizad (ex American Ambassador to UN) salivating for the job.
What India should look for in this scenario?
1.India must look at the surge of US forces and its deployment.Whether it is trying to stop the poppy cultivation or trying to act as a protector of Afghan farmers doing the cultivation?
2.Whether any effort is being made to stop the 10% tax which Taliban are imposing on behalf of ISI?
3. What type of new war lords are being created and what are they being asked to do?
4.Whether Drone attacks are being stopped inside Pakistan as demanded by Pakistan and Turkey.
5.Whether HAWALA is being routed through Peshawar or through Herat?
6.What happens to GITMO detainees ( who were actually drug lords caught during the 2001 war)who are going
to be released?
7.NATO forces are supposed to thin during 2011 .Who is allowed to take over in HELMAND in the guise of a criminal war lord(not Jihadi!!!) will be the significant pointers for Indian policy.If this guy is going to be a Saudi/ISI guy then India has to be wary of USA.
8.What role Turkey is going to play in the scheme of things will also be pointer to geopolitical landscape in future.TURKEY’S full solidarity and support for PAKISTAN’S sovereignty,political independence,and territorial
integrity is known.Indian foreign policy mandarins must look at turkey’s idea of Pakistan’s territory.(http://www.mfa.gov.tr/pakistan—turkey-joint-statement_-ankara_-october-27-31_-2008.en
Here is turkey, a major NATO MEMBER which is  functioning  in AFGHANISTAN  which is not a member of NATO, WHCH HAS NOT RECOGNIZED DURAND LINE ,which is its border with Pakistan(MAJOR non/NATO ally of USA) is being given the security cover by a NATO MEMBER.I do not know what is the take of Indian foreign policy Mandarins on this issue.What is the policy of Turkey on the border between Indian and Pakistan? The recent  spat between Erdogan and Peres of Israel is one of an issue or it is Turkey effort to gain the leadership of Islamic world though it recognises Israel may be with a wink from USA.
9.The effort by ISI to rekindle KHALISTAN AGENDA among the Sikh Diaspora especially in Canada has to be watched closely.The drug money
can win any one and white Canadian politicians are no exceptions. India knows how Canadian royal Mounted police handled its Sikh assets
even though they killed nearly 400 innocent Indians through mid air bombing of Air India jet.The ex/ISI boss Lt.Gen.Javed Nasir who is controlling 150 Sikh gurudwarahs in Pakistan through PGPC is known for his suaveness with regard to use of Drug money.He violently opposed Benazir’s distaste for fomenting Sikh extremism in India through ISYF( Lakhbir Rode),Wadhawan Neeta(Khalistan Zindabad force),P.S.Panjwar(KCF),Gajinder Singh(Dal Khalsa).All these guys especially Rode is being given leadership role for recruiting Sikhs in India through its agents or by reigniting Anandapur Saheb resolution through  remnants of Bhindranwale’s followers who are in legit mode in various political parties of Punjab.
10.The biggest threat is how this drug money is being used by Pakistan’s ISI to undermine INDIAN ECONOMY which it feels is the real reason for world taking note of India.This also will suits CHINA which is not at all happy at the rejuvenation of Indian psyche after the drubbing it gave in 1962.
a)Printing and distributing fake Indian currency notes through D/COMPANY, Sikh’s ISYF,HUJI(Bangladesh) along with Indian LET,JEM operatives in KERALA AND HYDERABAD.The recruitment for training of these operatives are done in Saudi Arabia,UAE etc where normally most of these expatriates work.Missing youths from these areas should be an area of prime concern for Indian security agencies.
b)Disrupting INDIAN TOURISM. Mumbai attack can be also seen as a sort of disruption of Indian tourism industry along with those attacks  in Jaipur,Bangalore and attempted ones in Goa.
c)Disrupting Indian Cricket especially the IPL being a money spinner for Indian Economy.
d)Along with Satyam, the Indian money bags can be vulnerable to BLACKMAIL. There is an email circulating about Swiss bank accounts of Indian Big cats and how Swiss authorities are willing to divulge the names if asked for by Indian Government.
As General Hamid Gul commented in a recent blog about RAW. It is 24/7 war with Indian Intelligence and he is proud of his ISI waging it successfully. The bombing of Indian embassy in Kabul may be an attack on those honest middle level intelligence operatives by ISI though it may look like a terrorist act. I understand the black market rate for obtaining an Indian visa from our Kabul embassy  is 300 US dollars for single day clearance while it is 200 US dollars for clearance in 4 days.This is a hefty bribe amount for ordinary Afghans who have to travel to India for MEDICAL HELP as in this one area none can beat India in the quality of health care for the money paid. But Indian staff have to be paid well enough so that they donot indulge in petty corruption. India also should think of opening a lady Gynaecology hospital meant only for ladies in Kandahar instead of building roads which serves the interest of ISAF.

OSAMA,AL-QUEDA,SAUDI ARABIA/ A HISTORY/Part 2

OSAMA , ALQUEDA,SAUDI ARABIA/ A HISTORY/-Part 2.
[Al-Dhiyabi] Were they an organized group? I mean, did their name exist
in that arena as the Egyptian Al-Jihad Organization or were they under
the umbrella of the so-calledjihadist groups or the Arab Afghans?

[Al-Qarni] They were not prominent. They lived there as
individuals. They did not operate as an organized group or a party that
had activities or a group that gave lectures to themujahidin.

[Al-Dhiyabi] It has been said that Usama Bin Ladin was the one who
assassinated Shaykh Abdallah Azzam because he wanted to be the only
Arab leader of the jihadist groups. He already had the money but he
sought additional legitimacy to be able to act and speak as the leader
of the mujahidin around him. What do you think of this theory?

[Al-Qarni] As to whether he was involved in Abdallah Azzam’s
assassination I would as soon accuse myself of this crime rather than
Bin Ladin. I knew that he and Azzam had a relationship of amity and
mutual respect.

[Al-Dhiyabi] Perhaps Azzam was assassinated by Bin Ladin’s "followers" without Bin Ladin being aware of the matter.

[Al-Qarni] It is possible, yes. It could have been done without
his knowledge, but I cannot believe that Bin Ladin was involved in
planning, financing, or even knowing about the assassination plan.

[Al-Dhiyabi] Do you think that the changing circumstances forced Bin Ladin to cooperate with the Egyptians?

[Al-Qarni] I cannot say that he was exactly forced to cooperate
with them. However, the changing circumstances made Bin Ladin find only
Al-Jihad Organization beside him. He found himself in circumstances
that drove him to move to the other side and to adopt violence as a
method. Many of the people who were acquainted withUsama Bin Ladin ,
and I was one of them, did not agree with his pursuit of this course.
We opposed him on making this choice. When the signs began to appear
that he was going to cooperate with Al-Jihad, we opposed him and tried
to show him that it was an erroneous course of action.

[Al-Dhiyabi] What was his response?

[Al-Qarni] Usama never liked to argue. He also liked to present
his views, listen to others, but then he refused to continue the
discussion. He would then make a decision.

[Al-Dhiyabi] He would listen to decisions or make decisions?>

[Al-Qarni] He would listen and then make his decision.

[Al-Dhiyabi] Is Bin Ladin proficient in shari’ah knowledge?

[Al-Qarni] Proficient, no. He had some knowledge of shari’ah and
liked to listen to the views of those Muslim jurists whom he trusted,
but he was never an expert jurist able to produce rules based
onshari’ah. No, he could not do that.

[Al-Dhiyabi] What about the recent leaked videotapes and the
calumnies he commits against the nation? He acts as if he is the
nation’s guardian. Do you not think that he is a man who places himself
above the Muslims’ imams?

[Al-Qarni] Usama Bin Ladin does not see himself as more proficient
in religious knowledge than the Islamic world’s illustrious scholars.
He does not think he knows more aboutshari’ah than Shaykhs Ibn-Baz or
Ibn-Uthaymin. His problem is that he considers some of the nation’s
ulema as lacking in resolve and loyal to the governments.

[Al-Dhiyabi] Based on your personal knowledge of Usama Bin Ladin, who is the person who is capable of influencing him?

[Al-Qarni] My relationship with Bin Ladin ended after he left
Sudan for good and went to Afghanistan. I last met with him before he
left Saudi Arabia to Sudan. Usama is the kind of man who can influence
others, not be influenced by others. He sees himself as an influential,
commanding personality. He believes that he influences people and is
not influenced by them. In those days he used to show me a lot of
respect and used to give me a prominent place in his gatherings.
However, he is not a person who can be influenced by any particular
person. He wants people to march behind him. His character developed in
this manner because he grew up in an environment of wealth and power.
From his youth he had an independent mind and always yearned to carry
out jihad. Before he went to Afghanistan to carry out jihad, many
people advised him not to go, to remain in his country, and confine his
role to financial support, that is, collect donations and send them to
themujahidin . They believed that this was a more important task than
going there himself. He did not find this a satisfactory state of
affairs. He wanted to be a leader, not a follower.

[Al-Dhiyabi] When he left for Sudan, did he ask you to go with him? How many times did he meet with you before he left?

[Al-Qarni] Before he went to Sudan I was always in touch with him.
Some jihadists, especially Egyptians, considered him an agent of the
Arab governments and intelligence services. Before he left for Sudan,
incidents occurred in Iraq and he began to make public speeches to
mobilize the people against SaddamHusayn’s regime. At one point his
activities stopped and some of his followers were arrested. He had
surrounded his house with barbed wire. The security services ordered
him to remove the barbed wire and live normally like everyone else.
Some security agencies began to summon him for interrogation. He
regarded this as an insult. He sensed that the road in front of him was
slowly becoming blocked and he began thinking of leaving the country.
He actually discussed this issue with me.

I did not agree with him and used to tell him this: We need to
stay in our country. This country cannot withstand strife and violence.
This is our country and we know it better than others. I then asked
him: Where shall we go? Where else can we find Mecca and Medina? To
what land shall we emigrate? This is the land of Islam.

[Al-Dhiyabi] Did he ask you to go with him to Sudan? Did he want you as an assistant?

[Al-Qarni] You could say that he trusted me as an adviser on
shari’ah issues and believed that I could serve as mufti or
theoretician to him.

[Al-Dhiyabi] This is proof that he lacked proper knowledge of shari’ah rules.

[Al-Qarni] He never regarded himself as an allamah.

[Al-Dhiyabi] Based on your personal knowledge of him and on the
videotapes that are released now and then, what impression do you get
when you listen to his voice these days?

[Al-Qarni] Based on these tapes, I feel that Bin Ladin has aged.

[Al-Dhiyabi] Did you not sense a sad note in his voice?

[Al-Qarni] Not at all. He does not have a hesitant or timid
character. Usama is a man who loves death, seeks it, and would like to
be martyred.

[Al-Dhiyabi] I disagree with you on this point. The proof is that
when the United States decided after 11 September 2001 to attack and
overthrow the Taliban regime, various countries and humanitarian
organizations asked him to spare the Afghan society the horrors of war,
death, and destruction but he preferred to let thousands die so that he
could save himself. This proves that he is the opposite of what you
claim.

[Al-Qarni] I do not agree that he preferred to let people die so that he could save himself.

[Al-Dhiyabi] According to your analysis, he loves martyrdom.

[Al-Qarni] He loves martyrdom but …

[Al-Dhiyabi] Do you not agree that martyrdom means sacrificing yourself to save thousands of Muslims from death?

[Al-Qarni] This is not the way he thinks. Take the example of the
US military forces invasion of Afghanistan. First of all, Usama was
under the Taliban’s command. He was not independent.

[Al-Dhiyabi] Who used to finance the Taliban?

[Al-Qarni] He financed the Taliban but was under their command. He
believed that Mulla Omar was the prince of the faithful. This is one
thing. The other thing is that he now lives under the command of a
regime that has collapsed. So he changed his strategy. The Taliban fell
and are now finished. Even from a military point of view, it is not
logical for him to stay and stand alone. So he withdrew to a remote
place where he could reorganize his forces and rearrange his agenda. I
sawUsama in the midst of fierce fighting. He is not the type of man to
flee and withdraw. There were battles when Usama was left alone with
only two or three other mujahidin. They used to stand and fight to
cover the entire mujahidin force’s withdrawal. He would withdraw only
when this was accomplished.

[Al-Dhiyabi] Who among his old friends, whom you knew, have remained with him?

[Al-Qarni] None of his old friends remain. Most of those who were
present in Afghanistan in that era returned here after the internal
conflict among the Afghan factions started. They changed their plans
and began to lead normal lives because the issue had turned into
sedition.Usama’s problem is that he became involved in that sedition. I
used to say this to the Arabs who visited Afghanistan during the
Taliban rule: If any of you can reachUsama , give him this advice on my
behalf. He should stay apart from the fighting among the Afghan
factions. He should not become part of the internal conflict. He should
not fight.

[Al-Dhiyabi] What is your opinion of Al-Qa’ida organization? Is
it a real organization built on organized military principles?

[Al-Qarni] What is the difference, whether it is an organization
or not? Doubtlessly certain circumstances developed, both regional and
global, that drove those persons to come together and cooperate. As to
whether it is an organization, it is certainly an organization.

[Al-Dhiyabi] An organization based on violence?

[Al-Qarni] Violence is one of its methods, indeed its most
important method when it comes to fighting the Americans and those who
collaborate with them. In their eyes this is a settled matter. They
have no problem in using violence and see it as a form of jihad.

[Al-Dhiyabi] How did they impart legitimacy under shari’ah to the
suicide operations that they carried out, which they called jihad
operations? How did they give legitimacy to killing hundreds of
innocent persons in exchange for one of them?

[Al-Qarni] In my opinion, it is not a question of legitimizing or
prohibiting suicide attacks. The issue is the target against which the
operation is carried out, but when one kills a Muslim person, even if
he kills him outside the scope of a suicide operation, that is a major
crime.

[Al-Dhiyabi] At this stage, do you think that Usama Bin Ladin has fallen into the hands of the Egyptian group?

[Al-Qarni] Most certainly. He is now part and parcel of the fabric
of Al-Jihad Organization’s ideology. He operates in line with its
plans.

[Al-Dhiyabi] You have known Bin Ladin personally? How do you see
the conclusion of this situation? Is it possible that he might get
weary of this path and turn himself in?

[Al-Qarni] This is totally impossible. Usama will continue to be a combatant until he dies even if he is left all alone.

[Al-Dhiyabi] Are all his sons with him? What is the latest
information about him? Do you get information from anyone? Do you
receive letters?

[Al-Qarni] No, after the arrival of the Americans and the strikes
against Tora Bora and the disappearance of Al-Qa’ida members, all
information completely stopped. No one goes there anymore; no one comes
back. But of course his entire family is with him, his wife and
children. Some of his sons returned early, however, including his
eldest sonAbdallah . Some of his sons are here in this country. As to
the other members of his family, I do not know where they live, in
Pakistan or are hiding somewhere with him. I do not know.

[Al-Dhiyabi] I would like to talk some more about Ahmad Shah
Masood. How did you make his acquaintance and make him trust you?

[Al-Qarni] During my stay there I became acquainted with most of
the leaders residing in Peshawar including Rabbani, Sayyaf, Hekmatyar,
and Shaykh Yunus. I got to know them. Masood remained an important
factor in the equation of the Afghan issue. I decided that I could not
have a complete understanding of the Afghan issue unless I met with
him. Otherwise I would not have a complete view of the issue. During
our stay there we came to realize thatMasood was the personality that
most influenced the course of the Afghan jihad and the person who would
bring victory to the mujahidin. Prior to that period many attempts were
made to unite the mujahidin ranks, strengthen them, and make them agree
on a single plan to enter Kabul and overthrow the communist regime. All
these attempts failed. The communist regime was actually weak but what
prevented its collapse was the disagreement among themujahidin although
many had a sincere desire to become united.

I also remember that Shaykh Abdallah Azzam, may he rest in peace,
used to praise Masood highly. This made me eager to become acquainted
with him. I decided that I should visit Masood regardless of any
difficulties. I did so on my own personal initiative actually. At the
same time the dispute between Masood and Hekmatyar was at its height,
so I told myself perhaps God might make me an instrument to reconcile
the two. We realized that if an agreement could be reached
betweenHekmatyar and Rabbani, 70 or 80 percent of the Afghan
mujahidin’s problems would be solved because they commanded the two
largest factions that could influence the course of the Afghan jihad.
They were against each other, however, and their dispute had a negative
effect. This is why I felt a strong desire to visitMasood in the areas
where he operated and get to know him. It was a personal desire. I
liked to become acquainted with the mujahidin leaders. It was natural
that I should seek to meet with a man like Masood.

[Al-Dhiyabi] Tell us exactly what you think. Did Masood bear a grudge towards Hekmatyar?

[Al-Qarni] First of all I would like to say that my decision to
visit Masood was met with strong opposition from the other mujahidin
factions, particularly from Afghan groups with which I had relations.
When they heard that I planned to visit Masood, they sent me what
almost amounted to a warning not to go.

In this episode Al-Qarni concludes his narrative about Usama Bin
Ladin, Ahmad Shah Masood, Hekmatyar, the dream of an Islamic state in
Afghanistan, Hekmatyar’s real role in creating dissension, and Masood’s
role in carrying out real jihad. He also speaks about the Shiite sect’s
participation in the Afghan jihad and the story of his last meeting
with BinLadin.

[Al-Dhiyabi] Were you not afraid of being assassinated when you went to stay with Ahmad Shah Masood’s army?

[Al-Qarni] In that period, no, not during that period but later on
there were times when something of the sort occurred. I will tell you
about it if you want. To reachMasood’s area of operation, you needed to
travel from Peshawar to Shatran in the extreme north of Pakistan, a
12-hour journey by car. When I decided to leave Peshawar, I concealed
the fact that I was going to visitMasood, primarily because I had
learned that the leaders did not wish me to go there. When I reached
Shatran, I stayed for a while at a guesthouse belonging to Rabbani’s
Jamiat-e Islami. Shatran is the border region from which you can
proceed to Masood’s areas.

One or two days later Muhammad Khayr, the official in charge of
the guesthouse, came to me and said: "Shaykh Musa, it has been rumored
all over Shatran that some Arabs have taken refuge with Masood."

I said to myself, so they now know. Shatran was one of the
world’s most active areas in espionage work because it is located on
the borders with China, Russia, Pakistan, and Afghanistan.

I answered him: "What should we do now?"

He said: "You need to remain concealed in this house for a long
time until they stop looking for you because certain intelligence
services are now investigating the identities of the Arabs who want to
joinMasood."

We stayed in that house for nearly a week, never going out, just
eating and sleeping. Afterwards they put us in a truck which was loaded
with foodstuffs but where hidden places were left for passengers to sit
among the goods. We could not be seen but we had openings on the top to
allow us to breathe. The truck traveled for around five hours until we
reachedMasood’s area during which time we passed through nearly 20
Pakistani checkpoints without being discovered. The soldiers manning
the checkpoints would ask the driver and his companion: "Are you
carrying Arab passengers with you?" The brothers would answer: "No,
there are no Arabs with us. The truck is full of foodstuffs."

[Al-Dhiyabi] Did they not search the vehicles since they were looking for Arabs?

[Al-Qarni] No, they did not. They told the driver to get on with
the journey. We drove until we reached a gate which had Masood’s emblem
on it. We continued to travel through Masood’s region, this time on the
backs of mules and sometimes on foot, until we reached his capital in
the north. We were dressed in Afghan garb.

[Al-Dhiyabi] How many were you?

[Al-Qarni] We were five persons and had traveled by road vehicles
around 12 hours from Peshawar to Shatran and then five hours from the
Afghan border until we reached Masood’s region.

[Al-Dhiyabi] Did you immediately meet with Masood?

[Al-Qarni] No, I met him only when I reached the north, in his own
capital. I noticed something significant. We slept at the first camp
inMasood’s region and in the morning I asked our traveling companion
Abdulwadud, who was one of Masood’s men: "Where are our weapons,
Abdulwadud?" He replied: "O Shaykh Musa, you are in Masood’s region.
You do not need weapons here at all?" I asked: "How is that?" He said:
"In the areas governed by Masood, if a walking stick is stolen, we find
out who it belongs to and we find it and return it to him."

I was incredulous and said: "Abdulwadud, you are exaggerating." He replied: "You will see."

From the border region we traveled until we reached Taloqan. We
had spent 10 days without carrying a weapon. We passed through cities
full of inhabitants. The schools were open, the clinics were operating,
the people were tilling their land, and living a secure and peaceful
life. OnlyMasood’s regular troops carried weapons. He had a regular
army, infantry, tank battalions, artillery forces, and a corps of
engineers. He had a state’s full army.

After about 10 days we reached Taloqan, the capital and largest
city of northern Afghanistan. Of course Masood was informed about our
arrival. They took us to a guesthouse there and an Algerian brother
called Abdelwahed who had lived in Masood’s areas for many years was
appointed as our escort, interpreter, and assistant. Two days later
Masood himself came to the house. After that he drew up a program for
us while we lived in his region. We were with him the entire time,
moving from one location to another. I personally spent a period of
three or four days with him.Masood , may he rest in peace, asked that I
spend some time with him alone with an interpreter. This was because a
trust and an intellectual harmony developed between us, especially when
he learned that my field of study was the principles of Islamic
jurisprudence. He asked many questions aboutshari’ah rules. I spent
three or four days in seclusion with him with only the interpreter
present. No one else knew of the place where we were staying except the
person who brought us food. During those few days we separated only at
bedtime. I may summarize his character in a few words. A man likeMasood
comes along only once every few centuries.

[Al-Dhiyabi] Apparently it was Al-Qa’ida that assassinated Masood, right?

[Al-Qarni] Yes, someone from Al-Qa’ida.

[Al-Dhiyabi] Do you think that the assassination was a consequence of incitement by Bin Ladin?

[Al-Qarni] I cannot rule this out. After Bin Ladin joined the
Taliban and swore allegiance to them, he began to think in a way that
made him believe that slaughtering Masood was a permitted action from
the viewpoint of shari’ah. Al-Qa’ida members and Bin Ladin’s young men
fought against Masood. All the Arabs that were with Bin Ladin were
against Masood and stood in the first rank of those who fought him.
Usama Bin Ladin never felt happy about Masood’s status. I want to
mention an important point. Unfortunately most of the so-called ulema
of the Islamic resurgence in our country here were against Masood and
on Hekmatyar’s side. For the past 10 years from the time of jihad until
today 99 percent of our well-known ulema of the Islamic resurgence here
have been against Masood.

It is a regrettable fact that most of the preachers here
supported Hekmatyar against Masood although I believe that Hekmatyar
was the person who had the most negative effect on the Afghan jihad. He
provoked internal strife among the mujahidin and squandered their
achievements. In contrast the man who worked hardest to win victory for
the jihad, to represent the mujahidin in Afghanistan, and to drive back
the communists was Masood.

[Al-Dhiyabi] Do you think that the Arab Afghans phenomenon was a
healthy thing, or did it damage the Afghan jihadist actions? The Arabs
used to carry out guerrilla warfare and hit-and-run attacks. They used
to go to Afghanistan, get some training, and then come back. They never
carried out organized action. Do you agree that they hurt
Afghan-Pakistani relations and Arab-Afghan relations, which caused the
Afghan masses to lose trust in them?

[Al-Qarni] To be fair I think that we need to divide the story
into stages. The first stage was the beginning of the jihad until the
fall of the communist regime and themujahidin’s capture of Kabul. The
second stage was the stage of sedition among the mujahidin and the
conflict between Hekmatyar and Masood , may he rest in peace, up to the
time when the Taliban state was established. The third stage lasted
from the emergence of the Taliban state until its fall. I believe that
these stages were clearly separate and different from each other.

During the first stage the presence of the Arabs was beneficial.
They were useful to the Afghan jihad, not only in the military sphere
but also in the sphere of education, advocacy of the Islamic faith, and
the dissemination of the Arabic language among themujahidin . I mean if
someone went to Kabul today, he might find dozens even hundreds of
young men aged 20-30 speaking Arabic fluently. They studied at the
schools and institutions that the Arabs established in Peshawar and
also inside Afghan territory. This was a huge effort that is not easy
to deny. The Afghans themselves recognize it.

During the second stage, which lasted from the beginning of the
factional strife until the establishment of the Taliban state, the
Arabs’ presence was detrimental. They were many Arabs in Afghanistan at
that time and there were camps that received a continuing flock of
young Arab men. This period was actually the beginning of the
development of deviant ideology among the youngmujahidin and the start
of the violence and sedition among the Muslims. It was a stage that
especially hurt the image of the Arabs. Some Arabs who planned to go to
Afghanistan used to come and ask me for advice. I used to tell them:
"Go to the training camps but do not interfere in the internal conflict
among the Afghan factions. If you can intervene as peacemakers, do so
but beware of bearing arms in the service of one side against the
other. I warned them against sedition. That period marked the
development of deviant ideology and wrong actions in the history of the
Arab Afghans. It also marked the start of enmity between the Arabs and
the Afghans.

This was followed by another stage after the fall of the Taliban
regime when, as you remember, the Arabs were seized and sent to
Guantanamo. Most of the inmates there are Arabs. Why? The Afghans
started to see the Arabs as their enemies and used to turn them over in
exchange for small sums of money. This was a stage that hurt the jihad.

The third stage was the Taliban stage of course. At this time the
Arabs were fewer in number because many of them returned when the
Taliban rule began. Personally I believe, and many youngmujahidin know
my view on this matter, that the purpose of making the Taliban seize
power was to destroy whatever had remained of the Afghan jihad. Of
course the Taliban had to demonstrate that they had anIslamist policy
to gain support. At the same time I would like to repeat what I said in
the past that either the Pakistani or the US intelligence service was
behind the establishment of the Taliban. I said this before and indeed
I said it to some Taliban leaders.

The Taliban’s assumption of power obliterated the so-far bright
and splendid image of jihad. The shining and pure image of Islam was
now distorted. All this occurred because of the Taliban’s seizure of
power and their insufficient understanding and distorted application of
Islamicshari’ah . I have a certain viewpoint on this issue. I would
like to state that the Taliban’s assumption of power in Kabul was a
calamity to the Afghan people.

[Al-Dhiyabi] There were exaggerated accounts of miracles taking
place among the mujahidin. Why were these fictitious stories
circulated?

[Al-Qarni] Theoretically miracles can occur. We do not deny
miracles. They are supernatural occurrences and they happen when God
Almighty wishes to do something that will uphold His religion by the
hand of his saintly followers. No reasonable person can deny this but
one should not tell exaggerated stories about it. Another thing is that
we should not accept just any story about a miracle that someone
recounts.

[Al-Dhiyabi] What is your assessment of the Islamic resurgence ulema during the Afghan jihad stage?

[Al-Qarni] The arena of jihad is open and any person can exploit
it and benefit from it. Why is this so? This is because when young men,
especially young men from our kingdom, used to go to Afghanistan and
then return, it was natural for them to meet with theulema and as a
result a sort of polarization, a sort of ideological trend, emerged.
Here in our country we lived through the periods of disagreements among
the Muslim Brothers, thesalafis, the followers of the Tabligh School,
the Sufis, et cetera. These trends were transferred from there to our
own country. I remember in this respect that Shaykh Abdallah Azzam ,
may he rest in peace, adopted a firm stance on this issue. Some
brothers came to us from Saudi Arabia and Kuwait and each of their
groups, which followed variousIslamist trends, wanted to establish
their own training camp. I remember this very well. Shaykh Abdallah
Azzam stood and declared: "Brothers, we came here to carry out a
nation’s jihad. Anyone who makes the declaration of faith that there is
no God but Allah can enter these training camps."

[Al-Dhiyabi] Did this hold true for everyone, whether the newcomer was a Sunni or a Shiite?

[Al-Qarni] There were no Shiites. They were all Sunnis because the
Shiites were not there. They were stationed on the Iranian border, not
in our areas.

[Al-Dhiyabi] Still the Shiites were not welcomed if they wanted to join the jihad, right?

[Al-Qarni] There were no Shiites and the issue did not arise
because no Shiites came to begin with. Shaykh Abdallah Azzam used to
say that this was a whole nation’s jihad open to everyone who said
there is no God but Allah and all the groups coexisted, the Sufis,
thesalafis, the Muslim Brothers, and the members of the Tabligh School.
Shaykh Azzam used to declare: "If you want to discuss the differences
among the various Islamic schools of thought, do it in your own
countries. Do not do it here." He did not allow any factionalism, but
still there were groups that established their own camps and their own
military training and had their own sources of finance. At this point
the first signs of divisions and disagreements began.

[Al-Dhiyabi] Did you play the role of inciter to Saudi young men
and encourage them to go and carry out jihad in Afghanistan?

[Al-Qarni] Yes. I had audiocassettes that promoted this call. I
used to exhort the people, especially young men, to join the jihad.

[Al-Dhiyabi] What method did you use to do this?

[Al-Qarni] I did it through lectures and religious lessons. I did
not rely solely on recorded audiocassettes. I also gave lectures.

[Al-Dhiyabi] Your students, the remaining brothers, are they still there?

[Al-Qarni] No. Those who were close to me subsequently returned. None remained. All of us came back.

[Al-Dhiyabi] Do you still meet with them?

[Al-Qarni] Yes, I still meet with those who now reside in this country.

[Al-Dhiyabi] What is your assessment of our nation’s current condition?

[Al-Qarni] First of all, we have experienced periods of pain and
sorrow at the condition to which the Afghan jihad has deteriorated. It
was a dream that the Islamic nation had entertained, but soon it began
to dissipate at the hands of themujahidin themselves, not the enemies.
This occurred as a result of factional conflict and narrow personal
interests. So we lived through this period of pain. I would like to
mention another important point, namely, the distortion of the image of
jihad and the attempt to alter its meaning to the point that the very
concept of jihad became vague in the minds of preachers and religious
scholars. It got to the point that some people began to renounce the
concept of jihad and claim that there is no longer any jihad if it
means murder, violence, and the killing of Muslims. This is a
distortion of concepts and it is a very serious matter to us, the
Muslims.

It is one thing when someone errs in his behavior, knows that he
has erred, or disobeys God and realizes what he has done. It is a
totally different thing when an entire concept of the Islamic nation is
distorted and the nation enters a dark tunnel and the entire process of
jihad turns into terrorism. It is a terrible thing when everymujahid is
considered a terrorist who carries out bombings and accuses other
Muslims of disbelief. This is a big problem and needs careful handling.

[Al-Dhiyabi] Did any of the Bin Ladin family urge you to intervene
and dissuade their brother Usama from going away after he decided to
leave Saudi Arabia?

[Al-Qarni] When they first contacted me, it was not to dissuade
him from leaving the country but to persuade him to return from Sudan
because he was already there. I would like to mention an important fact
now, namely, that during BinLadin’s stay in Sudan, the kingdom made
great efforts to persuade him to return to the country, settle down,
and lead a normal life. It sent him many envoys, including his own
mother who visited him in Sudan hoping to make him change his mind.
However, he persisted in the course of action he had chosen. His
brotherBakr asked me to visit him in Sudan and persuade him to return.
I asked to take permission first from Shaykh Bin-Baz, may he rest in
peace, because I believed that individual action would do no good. I
visited Shaykh Bin-Baz here in Riyadh and consulted him about the
issue. I said: "I would like my trip to be carried out with your
knowledge."

Shaykh Bin-Baz declined to intervene and told me no one had
approached him regarding this matter, neither the state nor Usama’s
brother Bakr. He said: "No one asked me and therefore I cannot
intervene."

After this response from Shaykh Bin-Baz, I also apologized and declined to go and see Usama.

[Al-Dhiyabi] When did the last telephone call between you and Usama Bin Ladin take place?

[Al-Qarni] After Usama left the kingdom, we did not call each other.

[Al-Dhiyabi] Was the last meeting between you and him in Jedda?

[Al-Qarni] Yes, the last meeting between us was in Jedda before he left the country.

[Al-Dhiyabi] How long before he left?

[Al-Qarni] We met about two months before he left. He told me that
he was going to Sudan to liquidate his assets and investments in that
country. That was the last meeting between

us.

[Al-Dhiyabi] Let us talk about the jihadist groups in Iraq. Usama
Bin Ladin installed Al-Zarqawi as leader of the Al-Qa’ida of Jihad
Organization in the Land of the Two Rivers, and Al-Maqdisi operated in
Jordan. Was this group that developed in Jordan a nucleus of the same
group that emerged in Saudi Arabia or was it stronger than thejihadist
groups that appeared in the kingdom?

[Al-Qarni] There is no doubt that Saudi young men played the
greatest role in financing, supporting, and influencing the course of
the Afghan jihad in the early stages. This is a well-known fact and the
Afghanmujahidin leaders still recognize it. The idea of jihad spread,
many Saudis returned to their country, although a few remained, but
after that violence erupted in Algeria.

[Al-Dhiyabi] Did any Saudis go to Algeria?

[Al-Qarni] I do not know if any went to Algeria.

[Al-Dhiyabi] What are your views on the various names used by these movements like salafism, jihadism, et cetera?

[Al-Qarni] In my opinion all these names are heretical
fabrications. Our legitimate name that God gave to us is the Muslim
people. Again I believe that the classification of Muslims as
liberals,Islamists, modernists, and conservatives is against shari’ah.
When the Islamists themselves divide themselves into salafis, Muslim
Brothers, followers of the Tabligh School, and jihadists , this is a
cause for divisions and strife. The name that God gave to us is enough,
namely, the Muslims. I debate this subject a lot with zealous young men
who use these appellations. Indeed some of them have told me: "You do
not use the name of any specific group." I always answer: "The name of
Muslim is enough for me."

[Al-Dhiyabi] What message would you like to address to Salman al-Awdah?

[Al-Qarni] This is what I want to say to him, and I do it from a
perspective of fraternity rather than criticism. I tell him: Let your
purpose be to seek God’s pleasure, not the people’s approval.

[Al-Dhiyabi] And what would you like to tell Ayid al-Qarni?

[Al-Qarni] Ayid al-Qarni is a beloved brother. This is my message
to him: You have now discovered the path by which you can bring benefit
to the people in the cause of God. So continue on this path.

[Al-Dhiyabi] And Safar al-Hawali?

[Al-Qarni] First of all, I have heard that he has been sick, so I
wish him good health. Secondly, my message to him is to keep an open
mind and heart to those who hold views different from his.

[Al-Dhiyabi] Nasir al-Umar?

[Al-Qarni] My message to him is that when he gives an opinion on an issue, he should try to provide sound shari’ah proofs.

OSAMA,AL QUEDA,SAUDI ARABIA/ A HISTORY

[Al-Dhiyabi] Do you support the idea of holding a dialogue with fugitives who appear on the government’s wanted list?

[Al-Qarni] Yes. Indeed I believe that dialogue is the best method.

[Al-Dhiyabi] What about those who refuse to respond to the call to
hold a dialogue or do not heed Interior Ministry’s call on them to
surrender?

[Al-Qarni] Those who reject dialogue condemn themselves to defeat.
Dialogue is the sound remedy for deviant ideologies. Those who reject
dialogue and respond only to security measures have already condemned
themselves to defeat.

[Al-Dhiyabi] What do you think of the escape of 23 prisoners in Yemen?

[Al-Qarni] I still cannot understand how they could escape. Where
were the security forces and the state security intelligence apparatus?
We are told that they dug a tunnel until they reached a mosque outside
jail. I still cannot understand this.>

OSAMA,AL-QUEDA,SAUDI ARABIA/ A HISTORY/Part 1

            
          SAUDI ARABIA AND ALQUEDA AND OSAMA/ A HISTORY

The following interview of Saudi academic Musa al-Qarni is
fascinating for the insight it gives about early days of Jihad,creation
of Al-queada and how Saudi Arabia financed them. It also shows how
Pakistani ISI along with Saudi Arabia promoted Qulbuddin Heketmayar who
was once hailed as hero for throwing acid on the faces of girls in
Kabul university.Gulbuddin had direct access to President Reagan and
his top Intelligence offcials when they were called "Mujahadin" by the
CIA.It also gives an understanding as to why Pakistani army is
conducting operation in Bajaur to throw out Afghan refugees back into
Afghanistan while allowing the Arabs to stay in Wazirstan.It also gives
us an inkling why when Saudi King abdullah called the meeting about
reconciliation ;Afghan Army chief Bismillah Khan,Taliban Foreign
Minister Abdul sale Zaeef,Gulbuddin Heketmayer,Nawaz sherriff and other
Jihadi leaders rushed to Riyadh for breaking bread with the Saudi
King.How Zardari and Karzai are now out of loop with CIA and why UK and
MI6 is calling the shots with poppytrade being exposed to outside
world.There is also an intimate connection to Malliki asking British
troops to leave Baghdad and their reluctance to leave.

This also shows how Arab jihadi group aligned with Heketmayar
were dead set against Ahmad Shah Masood and why they found it important
to kill him with first suicide bombing of Taliban.It also should
explain to Indian intelligence why Saudiarabia and ISI were interested
in the bombing of Kabul embassy and killing of its RAW personnel.

India must look at SAUDI ARABIA as the real enemy country with
its personnel orchestrying the human rights groups in India,funding of
Professors who are given specific tasks just like the HUJI professors
of Bangladesh who were recently exposed.How it doesnot want democracy
in any country and abhors WOMEN especially who work and show
INDEPENDENT THINKING like Benzair,Miss Fauzia Koofi and Mrs kakar.That
is why its agents put more effort to kill the Shia MLA of J&K.It is
also working with interim Bangladesh administration to keep out the two
begums especially Begum haseena so that war criminals are not
touched.Every Jihad historian must read this interview as why suddenly
keeping beard which was once welcomed as sign ofMujahadeen is now
condemned as fundamentalism.

Saudi academic Musa al-Qarni, who once led the incitement to jihad
in Saudi Arabia and traveled to Afghanistan in the early days of
"jihad" against the Russians, believes otherwise.

Al-Qarni is an exciting character, not only because of the events
he narrates about the "jihad" leaders, both dead and alive, and his
testimonies about yesterday’s "mujahidin" and today’s "terrorists", but
is also exciting because he has a calm personality that has enabled him
to pass through contradictory stages and then with great cleverness to
leave every one of his experiences behind him. He was the friend of all
factions. Among thetakfiris [those who brand other Muslims, including
their own governments, as infidels] he advocated respect for the
Islamic governments. He defended those whom themujahidin branded as
"apostates", such as Ahmad Shah Masood. Indeed he was a personal friend
of Usamah Bin-Ladin but an opponent of the Taleban regime. Al-Qarni is
a fantastic character that lived in harmony both with the zeal of
"jihad" and the quiet life of academia.

Al-Hayat met Al-Qarni and now publishes his interview in the following pages:

[Al-Dhiyabi] Tell us how you travelled to Pakistan, then Afghanistan and worked alongside the mujahidin in the 1980s.

[Al-Qarni] An academic course was being held in Peshawar,
Pakistan. I was a lecturer in those days and I asked the university
president to allow me to join the group that was attending the course
in Peshawar. I also informed him that if I went there, I would try to
learn about themujahidin’s conditions. I attended the course but found
time to visit the battlefronts to learn about the life of the
mujahidin. I made the acquaintance of Shaykh Abdallah Azzam and Shaykh
Abdul Rasul Sayyaf. In those days Shaykh Sayyaf operated a university
called the University of Call and Jihad in an area close to Peshawar
that had been named the Village of Migration. It had been specifically
established to house refugees from Afghanistan but most of the Arabs
who had come to Pakistan with their families also lived there.

At that time Shaykh Sayyaf had been elected as president of the
so-called Ittihad-e Islami, the Islamic Union for the Liberation of
Afghanistan. This group was formed after Muslim ulema and preachers
made efforts to unite various mujahidin factions in one body, so they
formed Ittihad-e Islami and elected Sayyaf as leader because he had
studied at Al-Azhar and spoke Arabic well.

This encouraged the Arabs to go and settle there. Their
destination was where Sayyaf resided because first of all he was the
president of Ittihad-e Islami and this gave him legitimacy in their
eyes and he was also proficient in Arabic. For this reason he had a
guest house in the village. Indeed I was a guest there for a long time.
This was the beginning.

Afterwards I wanted to stay with the mujahidin longer.
Consultations were held on how I could spend a long time with the
mujahidin. Since Shaykh Sayyaf had a university for call and jihad, he
told me: I will petition to let you become a lecturer at my university.

He made an application to the state to allow him to invite
lecturers to teach at the university. The application was referred to
Medina’s Islamic University, which responded by dispatching to him five
instructors to teach at the University of Call and Jihad, and I was one
of them. This went on for two years. Actually I played a role that was
different from the four other lecturers whose tasks were confined to
teaching.

[Al-Dhiyabi] Who were your colleagues at the University of Call and Jihad?

[Al-Qarni] They were Dr Hamdan Rajih al-Sharif, who is a retired
professor now; Dr Ibrahim al-Murshid, who now teaches in Al-Qasim;
Shaykh Rashid al-Ruhayli, a retired Islamic University professor who is
over 80 now; and Professor Dakhilallah al-Ruhayli who continues to
teach at the Islamic University. I was the fifth. As I said before,
their role was confined to teaching at the university but my role, by
virtue of my acquaintance withShaykh Sayyaf and the mujahidin, combined
teaching at the university with visits to the front to advocate the
faith and give lessons in religion and Islamic shari’ah to the young
mujahidin and also to take part in some operations.

[Al-Dhiyabi] What form did the advocacy of the faith take in those days?

[Al-Qarni] Many Arab young men who had joined the jihad lacked a
proper Islamic education. Indeed a large percentage of them had lived a
dissolute life before. Some did not become upstanding human beings
until they decided to join the jihad. They became honest persons and
immediately left to join the jihad. I know some youngmujahidin who were
later killed in the fighting – I wish God may count them as martyrs -
who had led dishonest lives before and indeed some had been really
dissolute. But they were attracted to jihad.

This fact actually helped me in my work as advocate of the faith
because I realized that many of those dissolute young men had something
good inside them but never found the proper environment that would
nurture them so they fell into an immoral mode of living. When they
first came to us, some of them did not even know the rules of prayer or
ritual cleansing prior to performing prayers. They had only come to
fight. My field of expertise wasshari’ah -related and I taught the
rules of physical purity before performing prayers and the rules of
worship. I instructed them in the rules governing jihad, invasion, war
spoils and combat and when they should fight and when they should
refrain from fighting. So they attended courses in these matters. At
the same time they attended military courses and received instructions
from military experts.

[Al-Dhiyabi] Did you yourself attend military courses? What did these courses focus on?

[Al-Qarni] They focused primarily on developing the quality of
endurance. As you know, Afghanistan has a mountainous terrain that has
no paved roads for vehicles. So the trainees had to learn to tolerate
hardship, to climb mountains and walk for 10-12 hours a day while
carrying their personal effects, weapons and food for the trip. It was
important to develop their power of endurance.

Secondly they were trained in the use of personal firearms. They
were in a war. They had to carry their personal weapon, a Kalashnikov
rifle, and know how to use it and how to use a pistol as well. Of
course military training differed from one fighter to another according
to personal aptitude and the role each was expected to play. Some
confined themselves to learning how to use a Kalashnikov. Some trainees
wanted to learn personal combat but others wanted to learn how to use
antiaircraft guns and antitank guns. Others wanted to learn how to use
mines, how to manufacture them and how to dismantle them, etc. The
military courses differed in these details according to the type of
trainee. Most combatants received training only in the use of personal
firearms,Kalashnikovs and pistols.

[Al-Dhiyabi] Did anyone receive training in suicide operations?

[Al-Qarni] No, there were no suicide operations at the time. The
young men used to attack tanks and fighter aircraft with their personal
weapons. The battle was open. The Russian bases with their tanks and
planes were there. You had your weapons and you could go and fight them
face to face.

[Al-Dhiyabi] Is it true that the university where you and your
four colleagues worked turned into a station for the relay of
intelligence data? Was the Village of Migration also a channel for
intelligence operations?

[Al-Qarni] It is necessary to have intelligence work. This is a
normal state of affairs. It was not possible for the combatants taking
part in the jihad in Afghanistan not to be backed by an intelligence
apparatus. It is simply impossible to operate without intelligence in
any country, including Pakistan and the United States. Even the
enemies, the Russians, had an intelligence apparatus and sometimes they
had moles in the ranks of the Afghanmujahidin . It is normal. However,
we never saw any of the intelligence work. The intelligence personnel
did not interact directly with themujahidin. They worked directly with
the politicians.

[Al-Dhiyabi] The mujahidin killed a group of people who used to
work with them, I mean they executed them saying that they discovered
that they had been providing information to other parties.

[Al-Qarni] This took place in the later stages. In the early
stages, the jihad was out in the open. Public operations do not provide
an opportunity for concealment. I will give you an example. Sometimes
certain countries would send intelligence operatives and indeed some of
them might have been sympathetic to the communists. Indeed we know that
some Arab countries were sympathetic to Russia. These countries used to
send intelligence personnel. What happened to those people? At first
they were received as guests and then invited to join themujahidin in
combat. What would such a person do? He would be forced to become a
combatant or if he was an intelligence agent, he would remain in the
rear among the migrants and civilians. He could not go to the front
because he would either be killed in combat or have his cover blown.
These people did not want to die especially when faced with the enemy.
When you confront the enemy, you must be prepared to die.

[Al-Dhiyabi] How many stages did the Afghan jihad go through in the 1980s?

[Al-Qarni] I would say the first stage lasted from the beginning
of jihad until the collapse of Kabul’s communist regime and the
mujahidin’s capture of the city. The second stage was the stage of
internal conflict among the mujahidin factions, the infighting. During
this period, we isolated ourselves from them. After the mujahidin
entered Kabul, I returned to Saudi Arabia and refused to participate in
any actions after that.

[Al-Dhiyabi] When exactly did you return?

[Al-Qarni] The problem is that I do not remember dates well.

[Al-Dhiyabi] In the early 1990s?

[Al-Qarni] Approximately.

[Al-Dhiyabi] Prior to the Taleban era?

[Al-Qarni] Yes, before the Taleban. When Ahmad Shah Masood entered
Kabul and Najibullah’s regime fell, I left. I believe this happened in
the 1990s. I and many other brothers who had gone to the jihad in
Afghanistan returned home.

[Al-Dhiyabi] Did Usamah Bin-Ladin return with you?

[Al-Qarni] He returned to the country, but went back to Afghanistan later.

[Al-Dhiyabi] Do you remember the date?

[Al-Qarni] Frankly, I cannot remember dates at all.

[Al-Dhiyabi] I have heard that the mujahidin used to refuse to memorize Western calendar dates.

[Al-Qarni] No, I am not like that. First of all most of those who
joined the Afghan jihad were not known by their real names but used
aliases such asAbu-this and Abu-that. I used my real name everywhere I
moved in Pakistan.

[Al-Dhiyabi] Was Bin-Ladin’s moniker Abu-Abdallah then, the same as today?

[Al-Qarni] Yes, Bin-Ladin was always called Abu-Abdallah from the
time he went there until today. He is well known. Everyone knows
Bin-Ladin.

[Al-Dhiyabi] Sulayman Abu-Ghayth was with you in those days. Do you know him personally?

[Al-Qarni] I do not know him.

[Al-Dhiyabi] Did you know Abu-Sulayman al-Makki, that is Khalid al-Harbi?

[Al-Qarni] Yes, we were acquainted with him at that time. He was one of the first mujahidin. He later went to Chechnya.

[Al-Dhiyabi] Let us talk more about your stay there.

[Al-Qarni] I stayed there for the first two years. Then the two
years of my appointment as lecturer on loan ended. I had earned a
sabbatical year by that time from my original university. I took that
year because I wanted to return to Pakistan on another appointment on
loan. Our original university decided that two years were enough and
terminated the loan programme. However, I spent my sabbatical there.
This means that I spent three years in Pakistan and Afghanistan. Later
on I returned to Afghanistan for another two years, which means I spent
a total of five years there.

[Al-Dhiyabi] Who took care of your family during those years?

[Al-Qarni] I still had my salary from the university and my wife’s
brothers lived close to her. Every six months I would go back and spend
two weeks with my family. This happened during the school year. During
the summer vacation I would take my family to stay with me there. I had
a house in the Village of Migration. I built a house there. I stayed
there for three consecutive years but I continued to visit that
university in later years during the summer vacations.

[Al-Dhiyabi] Is that university still operating?

[Al-Qarni] No, it is closed now.

[Al-Dhiyabi] Did you encourage extremism in those days?

[Al-Qarni] It was not called an extremist attitude at that time.
Fighting the communists was the prevailing idea. Today it is called
extremism. In those days it was called jihad. A Saudi architect was the
one who founded the college of architecture at that university. He was
a well-known brother who played a significant role in supporting jihad.
He was a professor at KingSa’ud University and had an architect’s
office in Medina. His name was Dr Ahmad Farid Mustafa.

[Al-Dhiyabi] How did the university operate?

[Al-Qarni] Part of the curriculum of the Call and Jihad University
was to instruct and train students in jihad. They were sent into
Afghanistan. It was a two-hour walk between the Village of Migration
and the Afghan border from the direction ofJalalabad. During the
Thursday-Friday weekend groups of university students would go to the
front and help the mujahidin.

[Al-Dhiyabi] Who used to train them, intelligence personnel?

[Al-Qarni] No, they had instructors. The Arab camps had Arab
instructors, some of whom were retired military officers with good
experience. The Afghans had their own instructors. The Pakistani army
also provided material and moral support.

[Al-Dhiyabi] At that stage Bin-Ladin operated under Abdallah Azzam’s command, right?

[Al-Qarni] Yes.

[Al-Dhiyabi] Did Bin-Ladin express his opinion on military matters?

[Al-Qarni] He certainly did and his views were respected but he
could not dictate his views. They had something that operated like a
council and it was this body that debated the

mujahidin’s affairs.

[Al-Dhiyabi] Describe the relations between Ahmad Shah Masood on the one hand and Abdallah Azzam and Bin-Ladin on the other.

[Al-Qarni] Shaykh Abdallah Azzam believed that no-one among the
mujahidin had Masood’s stature. He used to call him the hero of the
north. I remember that I once asked him about his opinion of this man.
Now the Arabs did not like Ahmad ShahMasood – this is something that
needs to become known. The Arabs hated him for several reasons. First
of all most of them were influenced byHekmatyar and lived as his guests
in his camps. It was well known throughout the jihad years that
Hekmatyar was Masood’s greatest enemy. The Arabs were influenced by
this enmity and became hostile to Masood on these grounds. Indeed some
Arabs hated Masood more than Hekmatyar himself.

[Al-Dhiyabi] Am I to understand that Hekmatyar welcomed the Arabs as his guests and incited them against Masood?

[Al-Qarni] Yes, this is a point that should become known. Masood
lived in northern Afghanistan, nearer to the Russian positions. He was
not close to Pakistan. It took people 20 days to reach Masood’s
positions from the Pakistani border. As a result Masood did not have an
office in Peshawar, nor an information representative. He was stationed
in the north directly on the combat lines with the Russians. In
contrast,Hekmatyar and Sayyaf had camps and operated on fronts that
were very close to Pakistan in the Pashtun region. Most of the Arabs
who came to Pakistan and Afghanistan were on the side of Hekmatyar and
Sayyaf. You could say that 95 per cent of the Arabs who joined the
jihad divided themselves between Hekmatyar and Sayyaf. A small
percentage joined Yunus Khalis and Jaluleddin Haqqani.

Very few Arabs joined Ahmad Shah Masood. There few of them and we
knew every one. This was the first factor that made the Arabs hate
Masood, namely, Hekmatyar’s enmity towards him.

The second reason why the Arabs hated Masood, may he rest in
peace, was that he was a methodical, strategic thinker. Combat is an
organized affair, not a chaotic operation. The Arabs, many of them or
actually most of them who came to carry out jihad, were not fond of
military discipline. They were disorganized. Some came and stayed for
one week only. They would join an operation, fire their weapons, storm
a position and then return. Some stayed for a month or two and so on.
For this reason the fronts on whichSayyaf and Hekmatyar operated were
wide open places where people came and went.

[Al-Dhiyabi] Are you telling me that Hekmatyar’s and Sayyaf’s guest houses were like open coffee shops?

[Al-Qarni] I mean that they did not impose a strict regimen or
force the mujahidin who joined them to stay for a particular period.
This is what I mean. Masood was the opposite. He did not accept anyone
who came unless he was prepared to stay on and operate under his
command. He did not allow anyone to go and carry out operations except
when he expressly ordered him to do so. The Arabs operating on the
fronts ofHekmatyar and Sayyaf were independent. They could carry out
their own operations. They did whatever they wanted without
supervision. There was no-one to hold them accountable.

A group of Arabs joined Masood in the early days of jihad. They
went there with the same mindset with which they dealt with Sayyaf and
Hekmatyar. After they joined Masood, they planned and carried out an
operation all by themselves without his knowledge. They attacked
Muslim, not Russian, convoys. WhenMasood learned of this, he put them
in jail and they were only released after a lot of pleading and
intercession by certain quarters. So those who were imprisoned byMasood
returned to Hekmatyar in Peshawar and they had developed an
unbelievable level of hostility towards Masood because he had jailed
them and disapproved of their behaviour.

Shaykh Abdallah Azzam visited Masood after a lot of negative talk
was heard about him in Peshawar. Some accused Masood of being an agent
of the West. They said this because his father had been a general in
the Afghan army and the children of generals were sent to Western
schools. Because he had studied in such schools, they accused him of
being an agent of the West. This was one thing. He was also accused of
immoral actions. Some people actually levelled accusations of
immorality against him. The Arabs spread a lot of negative propaganda
about him in Peshawar. This reached the point where they were
discussing whether it was proper or not from an Islamic viewpoint to
support him with money.

[Al-Dhiyabi] It has been said that Masood is a Shi’i.

[Al-Qarni] No, he is Sunni. I remember that when there was too
much talk about him in Peshawar, a session was held to try him in
absentia. Two people acted as his defence and 21 acted as his accusers.
The two who defended him were Algerian nationals: Abdallah Uns, who now
lives in Britain and is Shaykh Abdallah Azzam’s son-in-law, and a man
called Qari Abdelrahim. They had lived with Masood and knew him well.
On the other side 21 people including Algerians, Egyptians and Yemenis
acted as accusers. There were no Saudis among them. They accusedMasood
of offences amounting to apostasy. The trial was held and among those
present were Abdallah Azzam, Shaykh Abd-al-Majid al-Zindani and Usamah
Bin-Ladin.

[Al-Dhiyabi] How long did the trial last?

[Al-Qarni] It lasted a whole week. Of course they asked me to give
testimony but I refused to get involved. Nevertheless I followed what
was happening. I received my information fromShaykh Abdallah Azzam,
Shaykh Al-Zindani, Bin-Ladin, Abdallah Uns and Qari Abdelrahim. A
curious thing was that a brother of Qari Abdelrahim, who was called
Qari Said, was one of Masood’s bitterest enemies. I ask God to forgive
Qari and have mercy on his soul. After he returned to Algeria from
Afghanistan, he joined the armed groups there and was killed. The 21
accusers failed to proveMasood’s guilt on any of the charges they
levelled against him. When the presiding committee announced its
verdict, its members declared that they would not say anything either
in praise or vilification ofMasood.

[Al-Dhiyabi] What do you think of this verdict?

[Al-Qarni] I think it was unfair. You should either prove a
person’s guilt or exonerate him but the committee ruled this way
because Usamah Bin-Ladin and Shaykh Abd-al-Majid al-Zindani were more
inclined to support Hekmatyar than Masood. Additionally they did not
want to go against the wishes of the Arabs who were in Peshawar, saying
to themselves: All the Arabs in the city are againstMasood, so how
could we praise him?

The only exception was Shaykh Abdallah Azzam, may he rest in
peace. He said: As for me, I will praise Masood until I go to my Maker,
God Almighty. He left that trial session and began implementing a plan
to praise Masood. He wrote a book about him called "The Titans of the
North". He could not get it printed, however, because almost all of
Peshawar was semi-owned byHekmatyar and Sayyaf. Masood had no influence
there. So the book was not printed.

I once asked Shaykh Abdallah Azzam, may he rest in peace: Shaykh
Abdallah, do you still believe that Masood is the hero of Afghanistan?

Azzam replied: Indeed he is the hero of Islam.

After this I told myself that I should pay a visit to Masood and
get to know him from up close. Brother Abdallah Uns used to talk to me
about Masood. I used to see his jihad as a different form of jihad. The
mujahidin in southern Afghanistan conducted a form of guerrilla
warfare. This means you cannot destroy your enemy but you can continue
fighting forever. It was a form of hit-and-run warfare without a clear
strategy. This is whySayyaf, Hekmatyar, Haqqani, Yunus Khalis and all
the other factions in Peshawar could not capture any of the major
cities. They lived in the mountains, valleys and small villages,
conducting a hit-and-run form of combat. They would carry out an
attack, seize war spoils, but then the communists would come and expel
them from the positions they had occupied, and so on.Masood, on the
other hand, conducted a form of regular warfare. He had a regular army
and a clear strategy.

In the second episode of his interview with Al-Hayah Al-Qarni
continues to recount the history of the disagreements, stances, and
events that swept through the "mujahidin’s" state in Afghanistan, which
was subsequently hijacked by the fundamentalist Taliban movement. He
recounts the story of Shaykh Abdallah Azzam’s killing. He makes certain
intimations about Usama Bin Ladin in which he asserts that Bin Ladin
would never surrender. He tells how he used to be the personal mufti
[interpreter of shari'ah rules] of Bin Ladin who eventually became the
world’s most dangerous wanted man.

[Al-Dhiyabi] Who used to back Ahmad Shah Masood other than the United States?

[Al-Qarni] Masood was not backed by the United States. The entire
US aid used to reach the mujahidin through the Pakistani army. The
Pakistani army considered that its enemy number one in Afghanistan was
not the communists but Masood. When he left Peshawar, he had to flee. I
saw the weapons that Masood had in his possession. Most of it was
Russian: tanks, planes, and firearms seized as spoils from the
Russians. The aid that Masood received from other quarters was small.
Priority in aid was given to Sayyaf, Hekmatyar, and Yunus Khalis
although they had fewer troops. However, they were Pashtun and thus had
relations with the Pakistani Government. Masood was one of
[Burhanuddin] Rabbani’s military commanders and he received a portion
of the aid sent to Rabbani. Masood obtained most of his weapons through
self-reliance. I saw the weapons he had and most of them were war
spoils. He had another source of backing. I asked him about this when I
stayed for about a month with him. Sometimes I used to spend around 12
hours daily with him. Sometimes we were alone, I and he and an
interpreter only. We spent many hours together and developed a strong
bond with each other.

[Al-Dhiyabi] Did you sense that he bore the Arab Afghans a grudge?

[Al-Qarni] Masood was not a man to bear grudges.

[Al-Dhiyabi] Tell us how the fighting between Hekmatyar and Masood became more intense.

[Al-Qarni] That was a bloody war in Afghanistan. Hekmatyar used to
fight Ahmad Shah Masood more fiercely than he fought the communists. He
gave more priority to fighting Masood than to fighting the Russians.
For this reason, when Masood captured Kabul, Hekmatyar refused to enter
the city and declared war on Masood. He did this although before he
entered Kabul, Masood came to an area outside Peshawar and sent word to
all the mujahidin to come and meet with him. He told them: Kabul has
fallen. Now form a government among yourselves in Peshawar and come and
assume power in Kabul. They all agreed to this exceptHekmatyar, who
came out of the meeting and declared war on Masood. He declared that he
would enter Kabul only under the black banners of Hizb-e Islami. Many
people tried to dissuade him from starting such a war.

[Al-Dhiyabi] Could you tell us how Abdallah Azzam was killed?

[Al-Qarni] Before Shaykh Abdallah Azzam was killed, a dispute
broke out between Rabbani and Hekmatyar. There was fierce fighting
between them in northern Afghanistan. Rabbani was of course represented
by Masood and Hekmatyar’s representative was a commander in the north
who was subsequently killed. His name was Sayyid Jamal, may he rest in
peace. The two sides fought bitterly to the point that roads were
closed, people could not travel, and foodstuffs could not reach the
villages.

Meetings were held by parties who were connected with the jihad
in an attempt to reconcile the two factions. A delegation came from
Saudi Arabia. It was a "popular" delegation, of course, composed of
persons that themujahidin trusted. It included Dr Muhammad Umar
al-Zubayr, former president of King Abd-al-Aziz University; Shaykh
Ibrahim Afandi, chairman of Al-Ittihad Club in those days; and Shaykh
Abd-al-Majid al-Zindani from Yemen. These were the most prominent
members and they had with them veteran supporters of jihad who had
spent time in Afghanistan. They asked me to act as moderator and
secretary during the meetings.

Shaykh Abdallah Azzam was at the front deep inside Afghanistan.
After he heard that a reconciliation committee was going to meet, he
arrived in Peshawar on the night of the meeting. I was one of the
closest people toShaykh Azzam. After the meeting delegations were sent
to Hekmatyar and Rabbani until an agreement was reached. I wrote the
agreement with my own hand.

It was a Thursday night, meaning that the following morning was a
Friday. We, the entire committee, were meeting in a villa in an area in
Pakistan calledDevine’s Colony. The committee members resided there and
held their meetings. We met on that night and completed writing out the
agreement at 12 p.m. All that was left was to sign. We wanted the
agreement to be signed that night so that it would be announced to the
people the next day, a Friday. The conferees decided thatShaykh
Abdallah Azzam would take the agreement to Rabbani’s house so that he
could sign it. Rabbani lived in Peshawar in a neighborhood close to
Devine’s Colony.

The conferees chose an Egyptian, who was a senior member of the
mujahidin called Shaykh Fathi Rifa’i, to go to Hekmatyar in a camp
outside Peshawar so he could sign the agreement.

As Shaykh Azzam was leaving, he said to me: "Come with me, Shaykh
Musa." He did this because he knew that there was a great amity between
me and Rabbani. We went in the night, me, Shaykh Abdallah Azzam, and
his nephew Abu-al-Harith who was also his chauffeur. We knocked on
Rabbani’s door and one of his bodyguards came out. He had been one of
our students. We told him about the agreement. He went and woke up
Rabbani. Rabbani came out to us and there at the front door we read to
him the text of the agreement by the car’s cabin light. He signed it
and we returned.Shaykh Fathi Rifa’i, who had gone to meet with
Hekmatyar, could not meet him at his house. He telephoned us and said
he could not meet Hekmatyar.

[Al-Dhiyabi] How did Rifa’i contact you?

[Al-Qarni] There were telephones in Hekmatyar’s office connected
to Shaykh Abdallah Azzam’s telephone. Rifa’i contacted us and said he
could not meet the engineer, which is what they called Hekmatyar.
Shaykh Azzam told Rifa’i: "Spend the night there and wait for him until
dawn prayers. Let him sign and bring back the agreement."

[Al-Dhiyabi] And you returned?

[Al-Qarni] Shaykh Abdallah Azzam’s eldest son had gone to Jordan
to get married. On the night that he arrived in Peshawar with his
bride, Shaykh Azzam left us after midnight after we returned from
Rabbani’s house. We heard news that he had asked Shaykh Rifa’i to stay
until the morning and get Hekmatyar’s signature and then return. We
agreed that we would all meet with Shaykh Azzam in the morning.

After we performed dawn prayers, Shaykh Azzam telephoned us and
said: When I arrived home, I found my son Muhammad and his wife had
arrived. I have no other time to see them except now. Let us delay our
meeting until after Friday prayers. You will pray with me at the mosque
and after that we will go together to Islamabad. We agreed to do this.

Later while we were sitting in the villa making preparations to
go to Friday prayers, the telephone rang. An Egyptian, who was a senior
member of themujahidin , raised the receiver. I was with him in the
same hall in the villa. I heard him shout at the top of his voice:
"There is no power except through Allah." Then he dropped the receiver
and said: "Shaykh Abdallah Azzam has been the victim of an
assassination." We asked: "Where?" He said: "In an area close to
Peshawar."

That area was close to where we were staying and close to Shaykh
Azzam’s house. It was there that the mosque where shaykh Azzam always
prayed was located and where the mujahidin would meet to listen to the
Friday sermon.

The original plan was for us to meet at Shaykh Abdallah Azzam’s
house after dawn prayers and then go to Islamabad. When Shaykh Azzam
found his son and his son’s wife had returned, he told himself he would
stay with his son for a while and then go and deliver his Friday sermon
at theSab al-Layl mosque. He had been at the fronts for a while and he
needed to spend some time with his sons. He decided to deliver the
Friday sermon after that and then we would all go to Islamabad. But
fate intervened and an explosive device that had been placed in a
culvert under the road was detonated when his car passed over it. His
sons Muhammad and Ibrahim were with him in the car.

When we heard the news we hastened, each in his own way, to the
site of the mosque. We found body parts strewn all over the place, some
hanging from tree boughs, some on the ground 50 meters away. When we
asked aboutShaykh Abdallah , they said that he had been taken to the
hospital. His body was still in one piece. After he was proclaimed
dead, his body was taken to the Village of Migration whereSayyaf was
stationed. The people gathered and we prayed over his body after
evening prayers.

[Al-Dhiyabi] Who was behind the assassination?

[Al-Qarni] Frankly our analysis at that time rested on the idea
that the Israeli Mosad, with help from US intelligence, was behind the
assassination. However, after a while another analysis emerged
indicating that the Egyptian Al-Jihad Organization was behind the
killing. The members of this organization hatedShaykh Azzam and
regarded him as an obstacle to the scheme that they wished to implement
in Afghanistan. Personally I do not rule out this possibility.

[Al-Dhiyabi] This means that you are not completely ruling out the
possibility that the Mosad was the culprit but, based on the sequence
of events, you think that it is more likely that the Egyptian Al-Jihad
Organization carried out the killing?

[Al-Qarni] There is an important point to remember. Shaykh Abdallah Azzam was the founder of the HAMAS movement.

[Al-Dhiyabi] And Ahmad Yasin?

[Al-Qarni] Ahmad Yasin was the spiritual guide, but the man who
founded the movement and personally trained its cadres in Afghanistan
was Shaykh Abdallah Azzam.

[Al-Dhiyabi] Is this a historical fact or are you saying this because you loved the man?

[Al-Qarni] No, no. I would like you to read a published book called "HAMAS, the Historical Roots."

[Al-Dhiyabi] We cannot call the Palestinians and the entire HAMAS
movement liars and say that Abdallah Azzam founded the movement. We
could possibly say that Abdallah Azzam helped to found the movement,
but the real founder was Shaykh Ahmad Yasin.

[Al-Qarni] Perhaps.

[Al-Dhiyabi] Was the Egyptian Al-Jihad Organization strong and prominent in the Afghan arena in those days?

[Al-Qarni] Actually during the Afghan jihad era and up to the time
of Kabul’s fall Al-Jihad Organization did not have any roots in the
arena of jihad. It was in a dormant state. Of course its members found
a safe haven in Peshawar because it was an open place. You did not need
a passport or anything of the sort to live there. Any person could go
and live there without anyone asking questions. It was a place full of
immigrants from all over the world. So they found a safe haven there
where they could live with their families and reorganize themselves.
They were not known among themujahidin as active in the camps or on the
battlefronts. They did not lead operations nor had any ties with the
well-known Afghan jihad leaders. In the sphere of education and
advocacy of the faith they were not known at all. Today their most
prominent figure is Al-Zawahiri. He was not well-known in the days of
jihad as he is now. The most prominent Al-Jihad Organization figure was
a man they called DrFadl.

[Al-Dhiyabi] Is still he alive?

[Al-Qarni] I asked about him and where he had gone. They told me
that he had emigrated either to Australia or Canada and had completely
abandoned the jihad idea. He left Al-Jihad Organization, abandoned its
ideology, and lived a normal civilian life. Al-Jihad group was not
prominently known in those days. It was in a stage of reorganization.

[Al-Dhiyabi] Were they an organized group? I mean, did their name
exist in that arena as the Egyptian Al-Jihad Organization or were they
under the umbrella of the so-calledjihadist groups or the Arab Afghans?

[Al-Qarni] They were not prominent. They lived there as
individuals. They did not operate as an organized group or a party that
had activities or a group that gave lectures to themujahidin.

]]> http://captainjohann.wordpress.com/2008/10/15/osamaal-quedasaudi-arabia-a-historypart-1/feed/ 0 captainjohann http://captainjohann.wordpress.com/2008/10/15/osamaal-quedasaudi-arabia-a-historypart-2-2/ http://captainjohann.wordpress.com/2008/10/15/osamaal-quedasaudi-arabia-a-historypart-2-2/#comments Wed, 15 Oct 2008 15:38:15 +0000 captainjohann http://captainjohann.wordpress.com/2008/10/15/osamaal-quedasaudi-arabia-a-historypart-2-2 ]]> OSAMA , ALQUEDA,SAUDI ARABIA/ A HISTORY/-Part 2.
[Al-Dhiyabi] Were they an organized group? I mean, did their name exist
in that arena as the Egyptian Al-Jihad Organization or were they under
the umbrella of the so-calledjihadist groups or the Arab Afghans?

[Al-Qarni] They were not prominent. They lived there as
individuals. They did not operate as an organized group or a party that
had activities or a group that gave lectures to themujahidin.

[Al-Dhiyabi] It has been said that Usama Bin Ladin was the one who
assassinated Shaykh Abdallah Azzam because he wanted to be the only
Arab leader of the jihadist groups. He already had the money but he
sought additional legitimacy to be able to act and speak as the leader
of the mujahidin around him. What do you think of this theory?

[Al-Qarni] As to whether he was involved in Abdallah Azzam’s
assassination I would as soon accuse myself of this crime rather than
Bin Ladin. I knew that he and Azzam had a relationship of amity and
mutual respect.

[Al-Dhiyabi] Perhaps Azzam was assassinated by Bin Ladin’s "followers" without Bin Ladin being aware of the matter.

[Al-Qarni] It is possible, yes. It could have been done without
his knowledge, but I cannot believe that Bin Ladin was involved in
planning, financing, or even knowing about the assassination plan.

[Al-Dhiyabi] Do you think that the changing circumstances forced Bin Ladin to cooperate with the Egyptians?

[Al-Qarni] I cannot say that he was exactly forced to cooperate
with them. However, the changing circumstances made Bin Ladin find only
Al-Jihad Organization beside him. He found himself in circumstances
that drove him to move to the other side and to adopt violence as a
method. Many of the people who were acquainted withUsama Bin Ladin ,
and I was one of them, did not agree with his pursuit of this course.
We opposed him on making this choice. When the signs began to appear
that he was going to cooperate with Al-Jihad, we opposed him and tried
to show him that it was an erroneous course of action.

[Al-Dhiyabi] What was his response?

[Al-Qarni] Usama never liked to argue. He also liked to present
his views, listen to others, but then he refused to continue the
discussion. He would then make a decision.

[Al-Dhiyabi] He would listen to decisions or make decisions?>

[Al-Qarni] He would listen and then make his decision.

[Al-Dhiyabi] Is Bin Ladin proficient in shari’ah knowledge?

[Al-Qarni] Proficient, no. He had some knowledge of shari’ah and
liked to listen to the views of those Muslim jurists whom he trusted,
but he was never an expert jurist able to produce rules based
onshari’ah. No, he could not do that.

[Al-Dhiyabi] What about the recent leaked videotapes and the
calumnies he commits against the nation? He acts as if he is the
nation’s guardian. Do you not think that he is a man who places himself
above the Muslims’ imams?

[Al-Qarni] Usama Bin Ladin does not see himself as more proficient
in religious knowledge than the Islamic world’s illustrious scholars.
He does not think he knows more aboutshari’ah than Shaykhs Ibn-Baz or
Ibn-Uthaymin. His problem is that he considers some of the nation’s
ulema as lacking in resolve and loyal to the governments.

[Al-Dhiyabi] Based on your personal knowledge of Usama Bin Ladin, who is the person who is capable of influencing him?

[Al-Qarni] My relationship with Bin Ladin ended after he left
Sudan for good and went to Afghanistan. I last met with him before he
left Saudi Arabia to Sudan. Usama is the kind of man who can influence
others, not be influenced by others. He sees himself as an influential,
commanding personality. He believes that he influences people and is
not influenced by them. In those days he used to show me a lot of
respect and used to give me a prominent place in his gatherings.
However, he is not a person who can be influenced by any particular
person. He wants people to march behind him. His character developed in
this manner because he grew up in an environment of wealth and power.
From his youth he had an independent mind and always yearned to carry
out jihad. Before he went to Afghanistan to carry out jihad, many
people advised him not to go, to remain in his country, and confine his
role to financial support, that is, collect donations and send them to
themujahidin . They believed that this was a more important task than
going there himself. He did not find this a satisfactory state of
affairs. He wanted to be a leader, not a follower.

[Al-Dhiyabi] When he left for Sudan, did he ask you to go with him? How many times did he meet with you before he left?

[Al-Qarni] Before he went to Sudan I was always in touch with him.
Some jihadists, especially Egyptians, considered him an agent of the
Arab governments and intelligence services. Before he left for Sudan,
incidents occurred in Iraq and he began to make public speeches to
mobilize the people against SaddamHusayn’s regime. At one point his
activities stopped and some of his followers were arrested. He had
surrounded his house with barbed wire. The security services ordered
him to remove the barbed wire and live normally like everyone else.
Some security agencies began to summon him for interrogation. He
regarded this as an insult. He sensed that the road in front of him was
slowly becoming blocked and he began thinking of leaving the country.
He actually discussed this issue with me.

I did not agree with him and used to tell him this: We need to
stay in our country. This country cannot withstand strife and violence.
This is our country and we know it better than others. I then asked
him: Where shall we go? Where else can we find Mecca and Medina? To
what land shall we emigrate? This is the land of Islam.

[Al-Dhiyabi] Did he ask you to go with him to Sudan? Did he want you as an assistant?

[Al-Qarni] You could say that he trusted me as an adviser on
shari’ah issues and believed that I could serve as mufti or
theoretician to him.

[Al-Dhiyabi] This is proof that he lacked proper knowledge of shari’ah rules.

[Al-Qarni] He never regarded himself as an allamah.

[Al-Dhiyabi] Based on your personal knowledge of him and on the
videotapes that are released now and then, what impression do you get
when you listen to his voice these days?

[Al-Qarni] Based on these tapes, I feel that Bin Ladin has aged.

[Al-Dhiyabi] Did you not sense a sad note in his voice?

[Al-Qarni] Not at all. He does not have a hesitant or timid
character. Usama is a man who loves death, seeks it, and would like to
be martyred.

[Al-Dhiyabi] I disagree with you on this point. The proof is that
when the United States decided after 11 September 2001 to attack and
overthrow the Taliban regime, various countries and humanitarian
organizations asked him to spare the Afghan society the horrors of war,
death, and destruction but he preferred to let thousands die so that he
could save himself. This proves that he is the opposite of what you
claim.

[Al-Qarni] I do not agree that he preferred to let people die so that he could save himself.

[Al-Dhiyabi] According to your analysis, he loves martyrdom.

[Al-Qarni] He loves martyrdom but …

[Al-Dhiyabi] Do you not agree that martyrdom means sacrificing yourself to save thousands of Muslims from death?

[Al-Qarni] This is not the way he thinks. Take the example of the
US military forces invasion of Afghanistan. First of all, Usama was
under the Taliban’s command. He was not independent.

[Al-Dhiyabi] Who used to finance the Taliban?

[Al-Qarni] He financed the Taliban but was under their command. He
believed that Mulla Omar was the prince of the faithful. This is one
thing. The other thing is that he now lives under the command of a
regime that has collapsed. So he changed his strategy. The Taliban fell
and are now finished. Even from a military point of view, it is not
logical for him to stay and stand alone. So he withdrew to a remote
place where he could reorganize his forces and rearrange his agenda. I
sawUsama in the midst of fierce fighting. He is not the type of man to
flee and withdraw. There were battles when Usama was left alone with
only two or three other mujahidin. They used to stand and fight to
cover the entire mujahidin force’s withdrawal. He would withdraw only
when this was accomplished.

[Al-Dhiyabi] Who among his old friends, whom you knew, have remained with him?

[Al-Qarni] None of his old friends remain. Most of those who were
present in Afghanistan in that era returned here after the internal
conflict among the Afghan factions started. They changed their plans
and began to lead normal lives because the issue had turned into
sedition.Usama’s problem is that he became involved in that sedition. I
used to say this to the Arabs who visited Afghanistan during the
Taliban rule: If any of you can reachUsama , give him this advice on my
behalf. He should stay apart from the fighting among the Afghan
factions. He should not become part of the internal conflict. He should
not fight.

[Al-Dhiyabi] What is your opinion of Al-Qa’ida organization? Is
it a real organization built on organized military principles?

[Al-Qarni] What is the difference, whether it is an organization
or not? Doubtlessly certain circumstances developed, both regional and
global, that drove those persons to come together and cooperate. As to
whether it is an organization, it is certainly an organization.

[Al-Dhiyabi] An organization based on violence?

[Al-Qarni] Violence is one of its methods, indeed its most
important method when it comes to fighting the Americans and those who
collaborate with them. In their eyes this is a settled matter. They
have no problem in using violence and see it as a form of jihad.

[Al-Dhiyabi] How did they impart legitimacy under shari’ah to the
suicide operations that they carried out, which they called jihad
operations? How did they give legitimacy to killing hundreds of
innocent persons in exchange for one of them?

[Al-Qarni] In my opinion, it is not a question of legitimizing or
prohibiting suicide attacks. The issue is the target against which the
operation is carried out, but when one kills a Muslim person, even if
he kills him outside the scope of a suicide operation, that is a major
crime.

[Al-Dhiyabi] At this stage, do you think that Usama Bin Ladin has fallen into the hands of the Egyptian group?

[Al-Qarni] Most certainly. He is now part and parcel of the fabric
of Al-Jihad Organization’s ideology. He operates in line with its
plans.

[Al-Dhiyabi] You have known Bin Ladin personally? How do you see
the conclusion of this situation? Is it possible that he might get
weary of this path and turn himself in?

[Al-Qarni] This is totally impossible. Usama will continue to be a combatant until he dies even if he is left all alone.

[Al-Dhiyabi] Are all his sons with him? What is the latest
information about him? Do you get information from anyone? Do you
receive letters?

[Al-Qarni] No, after the arrival of the Americans and the strikes
against Tora Bora and the disappearance of Al-Qa’ida members, all
information completely stopped. No one goes there anymore; no one comes
back. But of course his entire family is with him, his wife and
children. Some of his sons returned early, however, including his
eldest sonAbdallah . Some of his sons are here in this country. As to
the other members of his family, I do not know where they live, in
Pakistan or are hiding somewhere with him. I do not know.

[Al-Dhiyabi] I would like to talk some more about Ahmad Shah
Masood. How did you make his acquaintance and make him trust you?

[Al-Qarni] During my stay there I became acquainted with most of
the leaders residing in Peshawar including Rabbani, Sayyaf, Hekmatyar,
and Shaykh Yunus. I got to know them. Masood remained an important
factor in the equation of the Afghan issue. I decided that I could not
have a complete understanding of the Afghan issue unless I met with
him. Otherwise I would not have a complete view of the issue. During
our stay there we came to realize thatMasood was the personality that
most influenced the course of the Afghan jihad and the person who would
bring victory to the mujahidin. Prior to that period many attempts were
made to unite the mujahidin ranks, strengthen them, and make them agree
on a single plan to enter Kabul and overthrow the communist regime. All
these attempts failed. The communist regime was actually weak but what
prevented its collapse was the disagreement among themujahidin although
many had a sincere desire to become united.

I also remember that Shaykh Abdallah Azzam, may he rest in peace,
used to praise Masood highly. This made me eager to become acquainted
with him. I decided that I should visit Masood regardless of any
difficulties. I did so on my own personal initiative actually. At the
same time the dispute between Masood and Hekmatyar was at its height,
so I told myself perhaps God might make me an instrument to reconcile
the two. We realized that if an agreement could be reached
betweenHekmatyar and Rabbani, 70 or 80 percent of the Afghan
mujahidin’s problems would be solved because they commanded the two
largest factions that could influence the course of the Afghan jihad.
They were against each other, however, and their dispute had a negative
effect. This is why I felt a strong desire to visitMasood in the areas
where he operated and get to know him. It was a personal desire. I
liked to become acquainted with the mujahidin leaders. It was natural
that I should seek to meet with a man like Masood.

[Al-Dhiyabi] Tell us exactly what you think. Did Masood bear a grudge towards Hekmatyar?

[Al-Qarni] First of all I would like to say that my decision to
visit Masood was met with strong opposition from the other mujahidin
factions, particularly from Afghan groups with which I had relations.
When they heard that I planned to visit Masood, they sent me what
almost amounted to a warning not to go.

In this episode Al-Qarni concludes his narrative about Usama Bin
Ladin, Ahmad Shah Masood, Hekmatyar, the dream of an Islamic state in
Afghanistan, Hekmatyar’s real role in creating dissension, and Masood’s
role in carrying out real jihad. He also speaks about the Shiite sect’s
participation in the Afghan jihad and the story of his last meeting
with BinLadin.

[Al-Dhiyabi] Were you not afraid of being assassinated when you went to stay with Ahmad Shah Masood’s army?

[Al-Qarni] In that period, no, not during that period but later on
there were times when something of the sort occurred. I will tell you
about it if you want. To reachMasood’s area of operation, you needed to
travel from Peshawar to Shatran in the extreme north of Pakistan, a
12-hour journey by car. When I decided to leave Peshawar, I concealed
the fact that I was going to visitMasood, primarily because I had
learned that the leaders did not wish me to go there. When I reached
Shatran, I stayed for a while at a guesthouse belonging to Rabbani’s
Jamiat-e Islami. Shatran is the border region from which you can
proceed to Masood’s areas.

One or two days later Muhammad Khayr, the official in charge of
the guesthouse, came to me and said: "Shaykh Musa, it has been rumored
all over Shatran that some Arabs have taken refuge with Masood."

I said to myself, so they now know. Shatran was one of the
world’s most active areas in espionage work because it is located on
the borders with China, Russia, Pakistan, and Afghanistan.

I answered him: "What should we do now?"

He said: "You need to remain concealed in this house for a long
time until they stop looking for you because certain intelligence
services are now investigating the identities of the Arabs who want to
joinMasood."

We stayed in that house for nearly a week, never going out, just
eating and sleeping. Afterwards they put us in a truck which was loaded
with foodstuffs but where hidden places were left for passengers to sit
among the goods. We could not be seen but we had openings on the top to
allow us to breathe. The truck traveled for around five hours until we
reachedMasood’s area during which time we passed through nearly 20
Pakistani checkpoints without being discovered. The soldiers manning
the checkpoints would ask the driver and his companion: "Are you
carrying Arab passengers with you?" The brothers would answer: "No,
there are no Arabs with us. The truck is full of foodstuffs."

[Al-Dhiyabi] Did they not search the vehicles since they were looking for Arabs?

[Al-Qarni] No, they did not. They told the driver to get on with
the journey. We drove until we reached a gate which had Masood’s emblem
on it. We continued to travel through Masood’s region, this time on the
backs of mules and sometimes on foot, until we reached his capital in
the north. We were dressed in Afghan garb.

[Al-Dhiyabi] How many were you?

[Al-Qarni] We were five persons and had traveled by road vehicles
around 12 hours from Peshawar to Shatran and then five hours from the
Afghan border until we reached Masood’s region.

[Al-Dhiyabi] Did you immediately meet with Masood?

[Al-Qarni] No, I met him only when I reached the north, in his own
capital. I noticed something significant. We slept at the first camp
inMasood’s region and in the morning I asked our traveling companion
Abdulwadud, who was one of Masood’s men: "Where are our weapons,
Abdulwadud?" He replied: "O Shaykh Musa, you are in Masood’s region.
You do not need weapons here at all?" I asked: "How is that?" He said:
"In the areas governed by Masood, if a walking stick is stolen, we find
out who it belongs to and we find it and return it to him."

I was incredulous and said: "Abdulwadud, you are exaggerating." He replied: "You will see."

From the border region we traveled until we reached Taloqan. We
had spent 10 days without carrying a weapon. We passed through cities
full of inhabitants. The schools were open, the clinics were operating,
the people were tilling their land, and living a secure and peaceful
life. OnlyMasood’s regular troops carried weapons. He had a regular
army, infantry, tank battalions, artillery forces, and a corps of
engineers. He had a state’s full army.

After about 10 days we reached Taloqan, the capital and largest
city of northern Afghanistan. Of course Masood was informed about our
arrival. They took us to a guesthouse there and an Algerian brother
called Abdelwahed who had lived in Masood’s areas for many years was
appointed as our escort, interpreter, and assistant. Two days later
Masood himself came to the house. After that he drew up a program for
us while we lived in his region. We were with him the entire time,
moving from one location to another. I personally spent a period of
three or four days with him.Masood , may he rest in peace, asked that I
spend some time with him alone with an interpreter. This was because a
trust and an intellectual harmony developed between us, especially when
he learned that my field of study was the principles of Islamic
jurisprudence. He asked many questions aboutshari’ah rules. I spent
three or four days in seclusion with him with only the interpreter
present. No one else knew of the place where we were staying except the
person who brought us food. During those few days we separated only at
bedtime. I may summarize his character in a few words. A man likeMasood
comes along only once every few centuries.

[Al-Dhiyabi] Apparently it was Al-Qa’ida that assassinated Masood, right?

[Al-Qarni] Yes, someone from Al-Qa’ida.

[Al-Dhiyabi] Do you think that the assassination was a consequence of incitement by Bin Ladin?

[Al-Qarni] I cannot rule this out. After Bin Ladin joined the
Taliban and swore allegiance to them, he began to think in a way that
made him believe that slaughtering Masood was a permitted action from
the viewpoint of shari’ah. Al-Qa’ida members and Bin Ladin’s young men
fought against Masood. All the Arabs that were with Bin Ladin were
against Masood and stood in the first rank of those who fought him.
Usama Bin Ladin never felt happy about Masood’s status. I want to
mention an important point. Unfortunately most of the so-called ulema
of the Islamic resurgence in our country here were against Masood and
on Hekmatyar’s side. For the past 10 years from the time of jihad until
today 99 percent of our well-known ulema of the Islamic resurgence here
have been against Masood.

It is a regrettable fact that most of the preachers here
supported Hekmatyar against Masood although I believe that Hekmatyar
was the person who had the most negative effect on the Afghan jihad. He
provoked internal strife among the mujahidin and squandered their
achievements. In contrast the man who worked hardest to win victory for
the jihad, to represent the mujahidin in Afghanistan, and to drive back
the communists was Masood.

[Al-Dhiyabi] Do you think that the Arab Afghans phenomenon was a
healthy thing, or did it damage the Afghan jihadist actions? The Arabs
used to carry out guerrilla warfare and hit-and-run attacks. They used
to go to Afghanistan, get some training, and then come back. They never
carried out organized action. Do you agree that they hurt
Afghan-Pakistani relations and Arab-Afghan relations, which caused the
Afghan masses to lose trust in them?

[Al-Qarni] To be fair I think that we need to divide the story
into stages. The first stage was the beginning of the jihad until the
fall of the communist regime and themujahidin’s capture of Kabul. The
second stage was the stage of sedition among the mujahidin and the
conflict between Hekmatyar and Masood , may he rest in peace, up to the
time when the Taliban state was established. The third stage lasted
from the emergence of the Taliban state until its fall. I believe that
these stages were clearly separate and different from each other.

During the first stage the presence of the Arabs was beneficial.
They were useful to the Afghan jihad, not only in the military sphere
but also in the sphere of education, advocacy of the Islamic faith, and
the dissemination of the Arabic language among themujahidin . I mean if
someone went to Kabul today, he might find dozens even hundreds of
young men aged 20-30 speaking Arabic fluently. They studied at the
schools and institutions that the Arabs established in Peshawar and
also inside Afghan territory. This was a huge effort that is not easy
to deny. The Afghans themselves recognize it.

During the second stage, which lasted from the beginning of the
factional strife until the establishment of the Taliban state, the
Arabs’ presence was detrimental. They were many Arabs in Afghanistan at
that time and there were camps that received a continuing flock of
young Arab men. This period was actually the beginning of the
development of deviant ideology among the youngmujahidin and the start
of the violence and sedition among the Muslims. It was a stage that
especially hurt the image of the Arabs. Some Arabs who planned to go to
Afghanistan used to come and ask me for advice. I used to tell them:
"Go to the training camps but do not interfere in the internal conflict
among the Afghan factions. If you can intervene as peacemakers, do so
but beware of bearing arms in the service of one side against the
other. I warned them against sedition. That period marked the
development of deviant ideology and wrong actions in the history of the
Arab Afghans. It also marked the start of enmity between the Arabs and
the Afghans.

This was followed by another stage after the fall of the Taliban
regime when, as you remember, the Arabs were seized and sent to
Guantanamo. Most of the inmates there are Arabs. Why? The Afghans
started to see the Arabs as their enemies and used to turn them over in
exchange for small sums of money. This was a stage that hurt the jihad.

The third stage was the Taliban stage of course. At this time the
Arabs were fewer in number because many of them returned when the
Taliban rule began. Personally I believe, and many youngmujahidin know
my view on this matter, that the purpose of making the Taliban seize
power was to destroy whatever had remained of the Afghan jihad. Of
course the Taliban had to demonstrate that they had anIslamist policy
to gain support. At the same time I would like to repeat what I said in
the past that either the Pakistani or the US intelligence service was
behind the establishment of the Taliban. I said this before and indeed
I said it to some Taliban leaders.

The Taliban’s assumption of power obliterated the so-far bright
and splendid image of jihad. The shining and pure image of Islam was
now distorted. All this occurred because of the Taliban’s seizure of
power and their insufficient understanding and distorted application of
Islamicshari’ah . I have a certain viewpoint on this issue. I would
like to state that the Taliban’s assumption of power in Kabul was a
calamity to the Afghan people.

[Al-Dhiyabi] There were exaggerated accounts of miracles taking
place among the mujahidin. Why were these fictitious stories
circulated?

[Al-Qarni] Theoretically miracles can occur. We do not deny
miracles. They are supernatural occurrences and they happen when God
Almighty wishes to do something that will uphold His religion by the
hand of his saintly followers. No reasonable person can deny this but
one should not tell exaggerated stories about it. Another thing is that
we should not accept just any story about a miracle that someone
recounts.

[Al-Dhiyabi] What is your assessment of the Islamic resurgence ulema during the Afghan jihad stage?

[Al-Qarni] The arena of jihad is open and any person can exploit
it and benefit from it. Why is this so? This is because when young men,
especially young men from our kingdom, used to go to Afghanistan and
then return, it was natural for them to meet with theulema and as a
result a sort of polarization, a sort of ideological trend, emerged.
Here in our country we lived through the periods of disagreements among
the Muslim Brothers, thesalafis, the followers of the Tabligh School,
the Sufis, et cetera. These trends were transferred from there to our
own country. I remember in this respect that Shaykh Abdallah Azzam ,
may he rest in peace, adopted a firm stance on this issue. Some
brothers came to us from Saudi Arabia and Kuwait and each of their
groups, which followed variousIslamist trends, wanted to establish
their own training camp. I remember this very well. Shaykh Abdallah
Azzam stood and declared: "Brothers, we came here to carry out a
nation’s jihad. Anyone who makes the declaration of faith that there is
no God but Allah can enter these training camps."

[Al-Dhiyabi] Did this hold true for everyone, whether the newcomer was a Sunni or a Shiite?

[Al-Qarni] There were no Shiites. They were all Sunnis because the
Shiites were not there. They were stationed on the Iranian border, not
in our areas.

[Al-Dhiyabi] Still the Shiites were not welcomed if they wanted to join the jihad, right?

[Al-Qarni] There were no Shiites and the issue did not arise
because no Shiites came to begin with. Shaykh Abdallah Azzam used to
say that this was a whole nation’s jihad open to everyone who said
there is no God but Allah and all the groups coexisted, the Sufis,
thesalafis, the Muslim Brothers, and the members of the Tabligh School.
Shaykh Azzam used to declare: "If you want to discuss the differences
among the various Islamic schools of thought, do it in your own
countries. Do not do it here." He did not allow any factionalism, but
still there were groups that established their own camps and their own
military training and had their own sources of finance. At this point
the first signs of divisions and disagreements began.

[Al-Dhiyabi] Did you play the role of inciter to Saudi young men
and encourage them to go and carry out jihad in Afghanistan?

[Al-Qarni] Yes. I had audiocassettes that promoted this call. I
used to exhort the people, especially young men, to join the jihad.

[Al-Dhiyabi] What method did you use to do this?

[Al-Qarni] I did it through lectures and religious lessons. I did
not rely solely on recorded audiocassettes. I also gave lectures.

[Al-Dhiyabi] Your students, the remaining brothers, are they still there?

[Al-Qarni] No. Those who were close to me subsequently returned. None remained. All of us came back.

[Al-Dhiyabi] Do you still meet with them?

[Al-Qarni] Yes, I still meet with those who now reside in this country.

[Al-Dhiyabi] What is your assessment of our nation’s current condition?

[Al-Qarni] First of all, we have experienced periods of pain and
sorrow at the condition to which the Afghan jihad has deteriorated. It
was a dream that the Islamic nation had entertained, but soon it began
to dissipate at the hands of themujahidin themselves, not the enemies.
This occurred as a result of factional conflict and narrow personal
interests. So we lived through this period of pain. I would like to
mention another important point, namely, the distortion of the image of
jihad and the attempt to alter its meaning to the point that the very
concept of jihad became vague in the minds of preachers and religious
scholars. It got to the point that some people began to renounce the
concept of jihad and claim that there is no longer any jihad if it
means murder, violence, and the killing of Muslims. This is a
distortion of concepts and it is a very serious matter to us, the
Muslims.

It is one thing when someone errs in his behavior, knows that he
has erred, or disobeys God and realizes what he has done. It is a
totally different thing when an entire concept of the Islamic nation is
distorted and the nation enters a dark tunnel and the entire process of
jihad turns into terrorism. It is a terrible thing when everymujahid is
considered a terrorist who carries out bombings and accuses other
Muslims of disbelief. This is a big problem and needs careful handling.

[Al-Dhiyabi] Did any of the Bin Ladin family urge you to intervene
and dissuade their brother Usama from going away after he decided to
leave Saudi Arabia?

[Al-Qarni] When they first contacted me, it was not to dissuade
him from leaving the country but to persuade him to return from Sudan
because he was already there. I would like to mention an important fact
now, namely, that during BinLadin’s stay in Sudan, the kingdom made
great efforts to persuade him to return to the country, settle down,
and lead a normal life. It sent him many envoys, including his own
mother who visited him in Sudan hoping to make him change his mind.
However, he persisted in the course of action he had chosen. His
brotherBakr asked me to visit him in Sudan and persuade him to return.
I asked to take permission first from Shaykh Bin-Baz, may he rest in
peace, because I believed that individual action would do no good. I
visited Shaykh Bin-Baz here in Riyadh and consulted him about the
issue. I said: "I would like my trip to be carried out with your
knowledge."

Shaykh Bin-Baz declined to intervene and told me no one had
approached him regarding this matter, neither the state nor Usama’s
brother Bakr. He said: "No one asked me and therefore I cannot
intervene."

After this response from Shaykh Bin-Baz, I also apologized and declined to go and see Usama.

[Al-Dhiyabi] When did the last telephone call between you and Usama Bin Ladin take place?

[Al-Qarni] After Usama left the kingdom, we did not call each other.

[Al-Dhiyabi] Was the last meeting between you and him in Jedda?

[Al-Qarni] Yes, the last meeting between us was in Jedda before he left the country.

[Al-Dhiyabi] How long before he left?

[Al-Qarni] We met about two months before he left. He told me that
he was going to Sudan to liquidate his assets and investments in that
country. That was the last meeting between

us.

[Al-Dhiyabi] Let us talk about the jihadist groups in Iraq. Usama
Bin Ladin installed Al-Zarqawi as leader of the Al-Qa’ida of Jihad
Organization in the Land of the Two Rivers, and Al-Maqdisi operated in
Jordan. Was this group that developed in Jordan a nucleus of the same
group that emerged in Saudi Arabia or was it stronger than thejihadist
groups that appeared in the kingdom?

[Al-Qarni] There is no doubt that Saudi young men played the
greatest role in financing, supporting, and influencing the course of
the Afghan jihad in the early stages. This is a well-known fact and the
Afghanmujahidin leaders still recognize it. The idea of jihad spread,
many Saudis returned to their country, although a few remained, but
after that violence erupted in Algeria.

[Al-Dhiyabi] Did any Saudis go to Algeria?

[Al-Qarni] I do not know if any went to Algeria.

[Al-Dhiyabi] What are your views on the various names used by these movements like salafism, jihadism, et cetera?

[Al-Qarni] In my opinion all these names are heretical
fabrications. Our legitimate name that God gave to us is the Muslim
people. Again I believe that the classification of Muslims as
liberals,Islamists, modernists, and conservatives is against shari’ah.
When the Islamists themselves divide themselves into salafis, Muslim
Brothers, followers of the Tabligh School, and jihadists , this is a
cause for divisions and strife. The name that God gave to us is enough,
namely, the Muslims. I debate this subject a lot with zealous young men
who use these appellations. Indeed some of them have told me: "You do
not use the name of any specific group." I always answer: "The name of
Muslim is enough for me."

[Al-Dhiyabi] What message would you like to address to Salman al-Awdah?

[Al-Qarni] This is what I want to say to him, and I do it from a
perspective of fraternity rather than criticism. I tell him: Let your
purpose be to seek God’s pleasure, not the people’s approval.

[Al-Dhiyabi] And what would you like to tell Ayid al-Qarni?

[Al-Qarni] Ayid al-Qarni is a beloved brother. This is my message
to him: You have now discovered the path by which you can bring benefit
to the people in the cause of God. So continue on this path.

[Al-Dhiyabi] And Safar al-Hawali?

[Al-Qarni] First of all, I have heard that he has been sick, so I
wish him good health. Secondly, my message to him is to keep an open
mind and heart to those who hold views different from his.

[Al-Dhiyabi] Nasir al-Umar?

[Al-Qarni] My message to him is that when he gives an opinion on an issue, he should try to provide sound shari’ah proofs.

[Al-Dhiyabi] Do you support the idea of holding a dialogue with fugitives who appear on the government’s wanted list?

[Al-Qarni] Yes. Indeed I believe that dialogue is the best method.

[Al-Dhiyabi] What about those who refuse to respond to the call to
hold a dialogue or do not heed Interior Ministry’s call on them to
surrender?

[Al-Qarni] Those who reject dialogue condemn themselves to defeat.
Dialogue is the sound remedy for deviant ideologies. Those who reject
dialogue and respond only to security measures have already condemned
themselves to defeat.

[Al-Dhiyabi] What do you think of the escape of 23 prisoners in Yemen?

[Al-Qarni] I still cannot understand how they could escape. Where
were the security forces and the state security intelligence apparatus?
We are told that they dug a tunnel until they reached a mosque outside
jail. I still cannot understand this.>>

The following interview of Saudi academic Musa al-Qarni is
fascinating for the insight it gives about early days of Jihad,creation
of Al-queada and how Saudi Arabia financed them. It also shows how
Pakistani ISI along with Saudi Arabia promoted Qulbuddin Heketmayar who
was once hailed as hero for throwing acid on the faces of girls in
Kabul university.Gulbuddin had direct access to President Reagan and
his top Intelligence offcials when they were called "Mujahadin" by the
CIA.It also gives an understanding as to why Pakistani army is
conducting operation in Bajaur to throw out Afghan refugees back into
Afghanistan while allowing the Arabs to stay in Wazirstan.It also gives
us an inkling why when Saudi King abdullah called the meeting about
reconciliation ;Afghan Army chief Bismillah Khan,Taliban Foreign
Minister Abdul sale Zaeef,Gulbuddin Heketmayer,Nawaz sherriff and other
Jihadi leaders rushed to Riyadh for breaking bread with the Saudi
King.How Zardari and Karzai are now out of loop with CIA and why UK and
MI6 is calling the shots with poppytrade being exposed to outside
world.There is also an intimate connection to Malliki asking British
troops to leave Baghdad and their reluctance to leave.

This also shows how Arab jihadi group aligned with Heketmayar
were dead set against Ahmad Shah Masood and why they found it important
to kill him with first suicide bombing of Taliban.It also should
explain to Indian intelligence why Saudiarabia and ISI were interested
in the bombing of Kabul embassy and killing of its RAW personnel.

India must look at SAUDI ARABIA as the real enemy country with
its personnel orchestrying the human rights groups in India,funding of
Professors who are given specific tasks just like the HUJI professors
of Bangladesh who were recently exposed.How it doesnot want democracy
in any country and abhors WOMEN especially who work and show
INDEPENDENT THINKING like Benzair,Miss Fauzia Koofi and Mrs kakar.That
is why its agents put more effort to kill the Shia MLA of J&K.It is
also working with interim Bangladesh administration to keep out the two
begums especially Begum haseena so that war criminals are not
touched.Every Jihad historian must read this interview as why suddenly
keeping beard which was once welcomed as sign ofMujahadeen is now
condemned as fundamentalism.

Saudi academic Musa al-Qarni, who once led the incitement to jihad
in Saudi Arabia and traveled to Afghanistan in the early days of
"jihad" against the Russians, believes otherwise.

Al-Qarni is an exciting character, not only because of the events
he narrates about the "jihad" leaders, both dead and alive, and his
testimonies about yesterday’s "mujahidin" and today’s "terrorists", but
is also exciting because he has a calm personality that has enabled him
to pass through contradictory stages and then with great cleverness to
leave every one of his experiences behind him. He was the friend of all
factions. Among thetakfiris [those who brand other Muslims, including
their own governments, as infidels] he advocated respect for the
Islamic governments. He defended those whom themujahidin branded as
"apostates", such as Ahmad Shah Masood. Indeed he was a personal friend
of Usamah Bin-Ladin but an opponent of the Taleban regime. Al-Qarni is
a fantastic character that lived in harmony both with the zeal of
"jihad" and the quiet life of academia.

Al-Hayat met Al-Qarni and now publishes his interview in the following pages:

[Al-Dhiyabi] Tell us how you travelled to Pakistan, then Afghanistan and worked alongside the mujahidin in the 1980s.

[Al-Qarni] An academic course was being held in Peshawar,
Pakistan. I was a lecturer in those days and I asked the university
president to allow me to join the group that was attending the course
in Peshawar. I also informed him that if I went there, I would try to
learn about themujahidin’s conditions. I attended the course but found
time to visit the battlefronts to learn about the life of the
mujahidin. I made the acquaintance of Shaykh Abdallah Azzam and Shaykh
Abdul Rasul Sayyaf. In those days Shaykh Sayyaf operated a university
called the University of Call and Jihad in an area close to Peshawar
that had been named the Village of Migration. It had been specifically
established to house refugees from Afghanistan but most of the Arabs
who had come to Pakistan with their families also lived there.

At that time Shaykh Sayyaf had been elected as president of the
so-called Ittihad-e Islami, the Islamic Union for the Liberation of
Afghanistan. This group was formed after Muslim ulema and preachers
made efforts to unite various mujahidin factions in one body, so they
formed Ittihad-e Islami and elected Sayyaf as leader because he had
studied at Al-Azhar and spoke Arabic well.

This encouraged the Arabs to go and settle there. Their
destination was where Sayyaf resided because first of all he was the
president of Ittihad-e Islami and this gave him legitimacy in their
eyes and he was also proficient in Arabic. For this reason he had a
guest house in the village. Indeed I was a guest there for a long time.
This was the beginning.

Afterwards I wanted to stay with the mujahidin longer.
Consultations were held on how I could spend a long time with the
mujahidin. Since Shaykh Sayyaf had a university for call and jihad, he
told me: I will petition to let you become a lecturer at my university.

He made an application to the state to allow him to invite
lecturers to teach at the university. The application was referred to
Medina’s Islamic University, which responded by dispatching to him five
instructors to teach at the University of Call and Jihad, and I was one
of them. This went on for two years. Actually I played a role that was
different from the four other lecturers whose tasks were confined to
teaching.

[Al-Dhiyabi] Who were your colleagues at the University of Call and Jihad?

[Al-Qarni] They were Dr Hamdan Rajih al-Sharif, who is a retired
professor now; Dr Ibrahim al-Murshid, who now teaches in Al-Qasim;
Shaykh Rashid al-Ruhayli, a retired Islamic University professor who is
over 80 now; and Professor Dakhilallah al-Ruhayli who continues to
teach at the Islamic University. I was the fifth. As I said before,
their role was confined to teaching at the university but my role, by
virtue of my acquaintance withShaykh Sayyaf and the mujahidin, combined
teaching at the university with visits to the front to advocate the
faith and give lessons in religion and Islamic shari’ah to the young
mujahidin and also to take part in some operations.

[Al-Dhiyabi] What form did the advocacy of the faith take in those days?

[Al-Qarni] Many Arab young men who had joined the jihad lacked a
proper Islamic education. Indeed a large percentage of them had lived a
dissolute life before. Some did not become upstanding human beings
until they decided to join the jihad. They became honest persons and
immediately left to join the jihad. I know some youngmujahidin who were
later killed in the fighting – I wish God may count them as martyrs -
who had led dishonest lives before and indeed some had been really
dissolute. But they were attracted to jihad.

This fact actually helped me in my work as advocate of the faith
because I realized that many of those dissolute young men had something
good inside them but never found the proper environment that would
nurture them so they fell into an immoral mode of living. When they
first came to us, some of them did not even know the rules of prayer or
ritual cleansing prior to performing prayers. They had only come to
fight. My field of expertise wasshari’ah -related and I taught the
rules of physical purity before performing prayers and the rules of
worship. I instructed them in the rules governing jihad, invasion, war
spoils and combat and when they should fight and when they should
refrain from fighting. So they attended courses in these matters. At
the same time they attended military courses and received instructions
from military experts.

[Al-Dhiyabi] Did you yourself attend military courses? What did these courses focus on?

[Al-Qarni] They focused primarily on developing the quality of
endurance. As you know, Afghanistan has a mountainous terrain that has
no paved roads for vehicles. So the trainees had to learn to tolerate
hardship, to climb mountains and walk for 10-12 hours a day while
carrying their personal effects, weapons and food for the trip. It was
important to develop their power of endurance.

Secondly they were trained in the use of personal firearms. They
were in a war. They had to carry their personal weapon, a Kalashnikov
rifle, and know how to use it and how to use a pistol as well. Of
course military training differed from one fighter to another according
to personal aptitude and the role each was expected to play. Some
confined themselves to learning how to use a Kalashnikov. Some trainees
wanted to learn personal combat but others wanted to learn how to use
antiaircraft guns and antitank guns. Others wanted to learn how to use
mines, how to manufacture them and how to dismantle them, etc. The
military courses differed in these details according to the type of
trainee. Most combatants received training only in the use of personal
firearms,Kalashnikovs and pistols.

[Al-Dhiyabi] Did anyone receive training in suicide operations?

[Al-Qarni] No, there were no suicide operations at the time. The
young men used to attack tanks and fighter aircraft with their personal
weapons. The battle was open. The Russian bases with their tanks and
planes were there. You had your weapons and you could go and fight them
face to face.

[Al-Dhiyabi] Is it true that the university where you and your
four colleagues worked turned into a station for the relay of
intelligence data? Was the Village of Migration also a channel for
intelligence operations?

[Al-Qarni] It is necessary to have intelligence work. This is a
normal state of affairs. It was not possible for the combatants taking
part in the jihad in Afghanistan not to be backed by an intelligence
apparatus. It is simply impossible to operate without intelligence in
any country, including Pakistan and the United States. Even the
enemies, the Russians, had an intelligence apparatus and sometimes they
had moles in the ranks of the Afghanmujahidin . It is normal. However,
we never saw any of the intelligence work. The intelligence personnel
did not interact directly with themujahidin. They worked directly with
the politicians.

[Al-Dhiyabi] The mujahidin killed a group of people who used to
work with them, I mean they executed them saying that they discovered
that they had been providing information to other parties.

[Al-Qarni] This took place in the later stages. In the early
stages, the jihad was out in the open. Public operations do not provide
an opportunity for concealment. I will give you an example. Sometimes
certain countries would send intelligence operatives and indeed some of
them might have been sympathetic to the communists. Indeed we know that
some Arab countries were sympathetic to Russia. These countries used to
send intelligence personnel. What happened to those people? At first
they were received as guests and then invited to join themujahidin in
combat. What would such a person do? He would be forced to become a
combatant or if he was an intelligence agent, he would remain in the
rear among the migrants and civilians. He could not go to the front
because he would either be killed in combat or have his cover blown.
These people did not want to die especially when faced with the enemy.
When you confront the enemy, you must be prepared to die.

[Al-Dhiyabi] How many stages did the Afghan jihad go through in the 1980s?

[Al-Qarni] I would say the first stage lasted from the beginning
of jihad until the collapse of Kabul’s communist regime and the
mujahidin’s capture of the city. The second stage was the stage of
internal conflict among the mujahidin factions, the infighting. During
this period, we isolated ourselves from them. After the mujahidin
entered Kabul, I returned to Saudi Arabia and refused to participate in
any actions after that.

[Al-Dhiyabi] When exactly did you return?

[Al-Qarni] The problem is that I do not remember dates well.

[Al-Dhiyabi] In the early 1990s?

[Al-Qarni] Approximately.

[Al-Dhiyabi] Prior to the Taleban era?

[Al-Qarni] Yes, before the Taleban. When Ahmad Shah Masood entered
Kabul and Najibullah’s regime fell, I left. I believe this happened in
the 1990s. I and many other brothers who had gone to the jihad in
Afghanistan returned home.

[Al-Dhiyabi] Did Usamah Bin-Ladin return with you?

[Al-Qarni] He returned to the country, but went back to Afghanistan later.

[Al-Dhiyabi] Do you remember the date?

[Al-Qarni] Frankly, I cannot remember dates at all.

[Al-Dhiyabi] I have heard that the mujahidin used to refuse to memorize Western calendar dates.

[Al-Qarni] No, I am not like that. First of all most of those who
joined the Afghan jihad were not known by their real names but used
aliases such asAbu-this and Abu-that. I used my real name everywhere I
moved in Pakistan.

[Al-Dhiyabi] Was Bin-Ladin’s moniker Abu-Abdallah then, the same as today?

[Al-Qarni] Yes, Bin-Ladin was always called Abu-Abdallah from the
time he went there until today. He is well known. Everyone knows
Bin-Ladin.

[Al-Dhiyabi] Sulayman Abu-Ghayth was with you in those days. Do you know him personally?

[Al-Qarni] I do not know him.

[Al-Dhiyabi] Did you know Abu-Sulayman al-Makki, that is Khalid al-Harbi?

[Al-Qarni] Yes, we were acquainted with him at that time. He was one of the first mujahidin. He later went to Chechnya.

[Al-Dhiyabi] Let us talk more about your stay there.

[Al-Qarni] I stayed there for the first two years. Then the two
years of my appointment as lecturer on loan ended. I had earned a
sabbatical year by that time from my original university. I took that
year because I wanted to return to Pakistan on another appointment on
loan. Our original university decided that two years were enough and
terminated the loan programme. However, I spent my sabbatical there.
This means that I spent three years in Pakistan and Afghanistan. Later
on I returned to Afghanistan for another two years, which means I spent
a total of five years there.

[Al-Dhiyabi] Who took care of your family during those years?

[Al-Qarni] I still had my salary from the university and my wife’s
brothers lived close to her. Every six months I would go back and spend
two weeks with my family. This happened during the school year. During
the summer vacation I would take my family to stay with me there. I had
a house in the Village of Migration. I built a house there. I stayed
there for three consecutive years but I continued to visit that
university in later years during the summer vacations.

[Al-Dhiyabi] Is that university still operating?

[Al-Qarni] No, it is closed now.

[Al-Dhiyabi] Did you encourage extremism in those days?

[Al-Qarni] It was not called an extremist attitude at that time.
Fighting the communists was the prevailing idea. Today it is called
extremism. In those days it was called jihad. A Saudi architect was the
one who founded the college of architecture at that university. He was
a well-known brother who played a significant role in supporting jihad.
He was a professor at KingSa’ud University and had an architect’s
office in Medina. His name was Dr Ahmad Farid Mustafa.

[Al-Dhiyabi] How did the university operate?

[Al-Qarni] Part of the curriculum of the Call and Jihad University
was to instruct and train students in jihad. They were sent into
Afghanistan. It was a two-hour walk between the Village of Migration
and the Afghan border from the direction ofJalalabad. During the
Thursday-Friday weekend groups of university students would go to the
front and help the mujahidin.

[Al-Dhiyabi] Who used to train them, intelligence personnel?

[Al-Qarni] No, they had instructors. The Arab camps had Arab
instructors, some of whom were retired military officers with good
experience. The Afghans had their own instructors. The Pakistani army
also provided material and moral support.

[Al-Dhiyabi] At that stage Bin-Ladin operated under Abdallah Azzam’s command, right?

[Al-Qarni] Yes.

[Al-Dhiyabi] Did Bin-Ladin express his opinion on military matters?

[Al-Qarni] He certainly did and his views were respected but he
could not dictate his views. They had something that operated like a
council and it was this body that debated the

mujahidin’s affairs.

[Al-Dhiyabi] Describe the relations between Ahmad Shah Masood on the one hand and Abdallah Azzam and Bin-Ladin on the other.

[Al-Qarni] Shaykh Abdallah Azzam believed that no-one among the
mujahidin had Masood’s stature. He used to call him the hero of the
north. I remember that I once asked him about his opinion of this man.
Now the Arabs did not like Ahmad ShahMasood – this is something that
needs to become known. The Arabs hated him for several reasons. First
of all most of them were influenced byHekmatyar and lived as his guests
in his camps. It was well known throughout the jihad years that
Hekmatyar was Masood’s greatest enemy. The Arabs were influenced by
this enmity and became hostile to Masood on these grounds. Indeed some
Arabs hated Masood more than Hekmatyar himself.

[Al-Dhiyabi] Am I to understand that Hekmatyar welcomed the Arabs as his guests and incited them against Masood?

[Al-Qarni] Yes, this is a point that should become known. Masood
lived in northern Afghanistan, nearer to the Russian positions. He was
not close to Pakistan. It took people 20 days to reach Masood’s
positions from the Pakistani border. As a result Masood did not have an
office in Peshawar, nor an information representative. He was stationed
in the north directly on the combat lines with the Russians. In
contrast,Hekmatyar and Sayyaf had camps and operated on fronts that
were very close to Pakistan in the Pashtun region. Most of the Arabs
who came to Pakistan and Afghanistan were on the side of Hekmatyar and
Sayyaf. You could say that 95 per cent of the Arabs who joined the
jihad divided themselves between Hekmatyar and Sayyaf. A small
percentage joined Yunus Khalis and Jaluleddin Haqqani.

Very few Arabs joined Ahmad Shah Masood. There few of them and we
knew every one. This was the first factor that made the Arabs hate
Masood, namely, Hekmatyar’s enmity towards him.

The second reason why the Arabs hated Masood, may he rest in
peace, was that he was a methodical, strategic thinker. Combat is an
organized affair, not a chaotic operation. The Arabs, many of them or
actually most of them who came to carry out jihad, were not fond of
military discipline. They were disorganized. Some came and stayed for
one week only. They would join an operation, fire their weapons, storm
a position and then return. Some stayed for a month or two and so on.
For this reason the fronts on whichSayyaf and Hekmatyar operated were
wide open places where people came and went.

[Al-Dhiyabi] Are you telling me that Hekmatyar’s and Sayyaf’s guest houses were like open coffee shops?

[Al-Qarni] I mean that they did not impose a strict regimen or
force the mujahidin who joined them to stay for a particular period.
This is what I mean. Masood was the opposite. He did not accept anyone
who came unless he was prepared to stay on and operate under his
command. He did not allow anyone to go and carry out operations except
when he expressly ordered him to do so. The Arabs operating on the
fronts ofHekmatyar and Sayyaf were independent. They could carry out
their own operations. They did whatever they wanted without
supervision. There was no-one to hold them accountable.

A group of Arabs joined Masood in the early days of jihad. They
went there with the same mindset with which they dealt with Sayyaf and
Hekmatyar. After they joined Masood, they planned and carried out an
operation all by themselves without his knowledge. They attacked
Muslim, not Russian, convoys. WhenMasood learned of this, he put them
in jail and they were only released after a lot of pleading and
intercession by certain quarters. So those who were imprisoned byMasood
returned to Hekmatyar in Peshawar and they had developed an
unbelievable level of hostility towards Masood because he had jailed
them and disapproved of their behaviour.

Shaykh Abdallah Azzam visited Masood after a lot of negative talk
was heard about him in Peshawar. Some accused Masood of being an agent
of the West. They said this because his father had been a general in
the Afghan army and the children of generals were sent to Western
schools. Because he had studied in such schools, they accused him of
being an agent of the West. This was one thing. He was also accused of
immoral actions. Some people actually levelled accusations of
immorality against him. The Arabs spread a lot of negative propaganda
about him in Peshawar. This reached the point where they were
discussing whether it was proper or not from an Islamic viewpoint to
support him with money.

[Al-Dhiyabi] It has been said that Masood is a Shi’i.

[Al-Qarni] No, he is Sunni. I remember that when there was too
much talk about him in Peshawar, a session was held to try him in
absentia. Two people acted as his defence and 21 acted as his accusers.
The two who defended him were Algerian nationals: Abdallah Uns, who now
lives in Britain and is Shaykh Abdallah Azzam’s son-in-law, and a man
called Qari Abdelrahim. They had lived with Masood and knew him well.
On the other side 21 people including Algerians, Egyptians and Yemenis
acted as accusers. There were no Saudis among them. They accusedMasood
of offences amounting to apostasy. The trial was held and among those
present were Abdallah Azzam, Shaykh Abd-al-Majid al-Zindani and Usamah
Bin-Ladin.

[Al-Dhiyabi] How long did the trial last?

[Al-Qarni] It lasted a whole week. Of course they asked me to give
testimony but I refused to get involved. Nevertheless I followed what
was happening. I received my information fromShaykh Abdallah Azzam,
Shaykh Al-Zindani, Bin-Ladin, Abdallah Uns and Qari Abdelrahim. A
curious thing was that a brother of Qari Abdelrahim, who was called
Qari Said, was one of Masood’s bitterest enemies. I ask God to forgive
Qari and have mercy on his soul. After he returned to Algeria from
Afghanistan, he joined the armed groups there and was killed. The 21
accusers failed to proveMasood’s guilt on any of the charges they
levelled against him. When the presiding committee announced its
verdict, its members declared that they would not say anything either
in praise or vilification ofMasood.

[Al-Dhiyabi] What do you think of this verdict?

[Al-Qarni] I think it was unfair. You should either prove a
person’s guilt or exonerate him but the committee ruled this way
because Usamah Bin-Ladin and Shaykh Abd-al-Majid al-Zindani were more
inclined to support Hekmatyar than Masood. Additionally they did not
want to go against the wishes of the Arabs who were in Peshawar, saying
to themselves: All the Arabs in the city are againstMasood, so how
could we praise him?

The only exception was Shaykh Abdallah Azzam, may he rest in
peace. He said: As for me, I will praise Masood until I go to my Maker,
God Almighty. He left that trial session and began implementing a plan
to praise Masood. He wrote a book about him called "The Titans of the
North". He could not get it printed, however, because almost all of
Peshawar was semi-owned byHekmatyar and Sayyaf. Masood had no influence
there. So the book was not printed.

I once asked Shaykh Abdallah Azzam, may he rest in peace: Shaykh
Abdallah, do you still believe that Masood is the hero of Afghanistan?

Azzam replied: Indeed he is the hero of Islam.

After this I told myself that I should pay a visit to Masood and
get to know him from up close. Brother Abdallah Uns used to talk to me
about Masood. I used to see his jihad as a different form of jihad. The
mujahidin in southern Afghanistan conducted a form of guerrilla
warfare. This means you cannot destroy your enemy but you can continue
fighting forever. It was a form of hit-and-run warfare without a clear
strategy. This is whySayyaf, Hekmatyar, Haqqani, Yunus Khalis and all
the other factions in Peshawar could not capture any of the major
cities. They lived in the mountains, valleys and small villages,
conducting a hit-and-run form of combat. They would carry out an
attack, seize war spoils, but then the communists would come and expel
them from the positions they had occupied, and so on.Masood, on the
other hand, conducted a form of regular warfare. He had a regular army
and a clear strategy.

In the second episode of his interview with Al-Hayah Al-Qarni
continues to recount the history of the disagreements, stances, and
events that swept through the "mujahidin’s" state in Afghanistan, which
was subsequently hijacked by the fundamentalist Taliban movement. He
recounts the story of Shaykh Abdallah Azzam’s killing. He makes certain
intimations about Usama Bin Ladin in which he asserts that Bin Ladin
would never surrender. He tells how he used to be the personal mufti
[interpreter of shari'ah rules] of Bin Ladin who eventually became the
world’s most dangerous wanted man.

[Al-Dhiyabi] Who used to back Ahmad Shah Masood other than the United States?

[Al-Qarni] Masood was not backed by the United States. The entire
US aid used to reach the mujahidin through the Pakistani army. The
Pakistani army considered that its enemy number one in Afghanistan was
not the communists but Masood. When he left Peshawar, he had to flee. I
saw the weapons that Masood had in his possession. Most of it was
Russian: tanks, planes, and firearms seized as spoils from the
Russians. The aid that Masood received from other quarters was small.
Priority in aid was given to Sayyaf, Hekmatyar, and Yunus Khalis
although they had fewer troops. However, they were Pashtun and thus had
relations with the Pakistani Government. Masood was one of
[Burhanuddin] Rabbani’s military commanders and he received a portion
of the aid sent to Rabbani. Masood obtained most of his weapons through
self-reliance. I saw the weapons he had and most of them were war
spoils. He had another source of backing. I asked him about this when I
stayed for about a month with him. Sometimes I used to spend around 12
hours daily with him. Sometimes we were alone, I and he and an
interpreter only. We spent many hours together and developed a strong
bond with each other.

[Al-Dhiyabi] Did you sense that he bore the Arab Afghans a grudge?

[Al-Qarni] Masood was not a man to bear grudges.

[Al-Dhiyabi] Tell us how the fighting between Hekmatyar and Masood became more intense.

[Al-Qarni] That was a bloody war in Afghanistan. Hekmatyar used to
fight Ahmad Shah Masood more fiercely than he fought the communists. He
gave more priority to fighting Masood than to fighting the Russians.
For this reason, when Masood captured Kabul, Hekmatyar refused to enter
the city and declared war on Masood. He did this although before he
entered Kabul, Masood came to an area outside Peshawar and sent word to
all the mujahidin to come and meet with him. He told them: Kabul has
fallen. Now form a government among yourselves in Peshawar and come and
assume power in Kabul. They all agreed to this exceptHekmatyar, who
came out of the meeting and declared war on Masood. He declared that he
would enter Kabul only under the black banners of Hizb-e Islami. Many
people tried to dissuade him from starting such a war.

[Al-Dhiyabi] Could you tell us how Abdallah Azzam was killed?

[Al-Qarni] Before Shaykh Abdallah Azzam was killed, a dispute
broke out between Rabbani and Hekmatyar. There was fierce fighting
between them in northern Afghanistan. Rabbani was of course represented
by Masood and Hekmatyar’s representative was a commander in the north
who was subsequently killed. His name was Sayyid Jamal, may he rest in
peace. The two sides fought bitterly to the point that roads were
closed, people could not travel, and foodstuffs could not reach the
villages.

Meetings were held by parties who were connected with the jihad
in an attempt to reconcile the two factions. A delegation came from
Saudi Arabia. It was a "popular" delegation, of course, composed of
persons that themujahidin trusted. It included Dr Muhammad Umar
al-Zubayr, former president of King Abd-al-Aziz University; Shaykh
Ibrahim Afandi, chairman of Al-Ittihad Club in those days; and Shaykh
Abd-al-Majid al-Zindani from Yemen. These were the most prominent
members and they had with them veteran supporters of jihad who had
spent time in Afghanistan. They asked me to act as moderator and
secretary during the meetings.

Shaykh Abdallah Azzam was at the front deep inside Afghanistan.
After he heard that a reconciliation committee was going to meet, he
arrived in Peshawar on the night of the meeting. I was one of the
closest people toShaykh Azzam. After the meeting delegations were sent
to Hekmatyar and Rabbani until an agreement was reached. I wrote the
agreement with my own hand.

It was a Thursday night, meaning that the following morning was a
Friday. We, the entire committee, were meeting in a villa in an area in
Pakistan calledDevine’s Colony. The committee members resided there and
held their meetings. We met on that night and completed writing out the
agreement at 12 p.m. All that was left was to sign. We wanted the
agreement to be signed that night so that it would be announced to the
people the next day, a Friday. The conferees decided thatShaykh
Abdallah Azzam would take the agreement to Rabbani’s house so that he
could sign it. Rabbani lived in Peshawar in a neighborhood close to
Devine’s Colony.

The conferees chose an Egyptian, who was a senior member of the
mujahidin called Shaykh Fathi Rifa’i, to go to Hekmatyar in a camp
outside Peshawar so he could sign the agreement.

As Shaykh Azzam was leaving, he said to me: "Come with me, Shaykh
Musa." He did this because he knew that there was a great amity between
me and Rabbani. We went in the night, me, Shaykh Abdallah Azzam, and
his nephew Abu-al-Harith who was also his chauffeur. We knocked on
Rabbani’s door and one of his bodyguards came out. He had been one of
our students. We told him about the agreement. He went and woke up
Rabbani. Rabbani came out to us and there at the front door we read to
him the text of the agreement by the car’s cabin light. He signed it
and we returned.Shaykh Fathi Rifa’i, who had gone to meet with
Hekmatyar, could not meet him at his house. He telephoned us and said
he could not meet Hekmatyar.

[Al-Dhiyabi] How did Rifa’i contact you?

[Al-Qarni] There were telephones in Hekmatyar’s office connected
to Shaykh Abdallah Azzam’s telephone. Rifa’i contacted us and said he
could not meet the engineer, which is what they called Hekmatyar.
Shaykh Azzam told Rifa’i: "Spend the night there and wait for him until
dawn prayers. Let him sign and bring back the agreement."

[Al-Dhiyabi] And you returned?

[Al-Qarni] Shaykh Abdallah Azzam’s eldest son had gone to Jordan
to get married. On the night that he arrived in Peshawar with his
bride, Shaykh Azzam left us after midnight after we returned from
Rabbani’s house. We heard news that he had asked Shaykh Rifa’i to stay
until the morning and get Hekmatyar’s signature and then return. We
agreed that we would all meet with Shaykh Azzam in the morning.

After we performed dawn prayers, Shaykh Azzam telephoned us and
said: When I arrived home, I found my son Muhammad and his wife had
arrived. I have no other time to see them except now. Let us delay our
meeting until after Friday prayers. You will pray with me at the mosque
and after that we will go together to Islamabad. We agreed to do this.

Later while we were sitting in the villa making preparations to
go to Friday prayers, the telephone rang. An Egyptian, who was a senior
member of themujahidin , raised the receiver. I was with him in the
same hall in the villa. I heard him shout at the top of his voice:
"There is no power except through Allah." Then he dropped the receiver
and said: "Shaykh Abdallah Azzam has been the victim of an
assassination." We asked: "Where?" He said: "In an area close to
Peshawar."

That area was close to where we were staying and close to Shaykh
Azzam’s house. It was there that the mosque where shaykh Azzam always
prayed was located and where the mujahidin would meet to listen to the
Friday sermon.

The original plan was for us to meet at Shaykh Abdallah Azzam’s
house after dawn prayers and then go to Islamabad. When Shaykh Azzam
found his son and his son’s wife had returned, he told himself he would
stay with his son for a while and then go and deliver his Friday sermon
at theSab al-Layl mosque. He had been at the fronts for a while and he
needed to spend some time with his sons. He decided to deliver the
Friday sermon after that and then we would all go to Islamabad. But
fate intervened and an explosive device that had been placed in a
culvert under the road was detonated when his car passed over it. His
sons Muhammad and Ibrahim were with him in the car.

When we heard the news we hastened, each in his own way, to the
site of the mosque. We found body parts strewn all over the place, some
hanging from tree boughs, some on the ground 50 meters away. When we
asked aboutShaykh Abdallah , they said that he had been taken to the
hospital. His body was still in one piece. After he was proclaimed
dead, his body was taken to the Village of Migration whereSayyaf was
stationed. The people gathered and we prayed over his body after
evening prayers.

[Al-Dhiyabi] Who was behind the assassination?

[Al-Qarni] Frankly our analysis at that time rested on the idea
that the Israeli Mosad, with help from US intelligence, was behind the
assassination. However, after a while another analysis emerged
indicating that the Egyptian Al-Jihad Organization was behind the
killing. The members of this organization hatedShaykh Azzam and
regarded him as an obstacle to the scheme that they wished to implement
in Afghanistan. Personally I do not rule out this possibility.

[Al-Dhiyabi] This means that you are not completely ruling out the
possibility that the Mosad was the culprit but, based on the sequence
of events, you think that it is more likely that the Egyptian Al-Jihad
Organization carried out the killing?

[Al-Qarni] There is an important point to remember. Shaykh Abdallah Azzam was the founder of the HAMAS movement.

[Al-Dhiyabi] And Ahmad Yasin?

[Al-Qarni] Ahmad Yasin was the spiritual guide, but the man who
founded the movement and personally trained its cadres in Afghanistan
was Shaykh Abdallah Azzam.

[Al-Dhiyabi] Is this a historical fact or are you saying this because you loved the man?

[Al-Qarni] No, no. I would like you to read a published book called "HAMAS, the Historical Roots."

[Al-Dhiyabi] We cannot call the Palestinians and the entire HAMAS
movement liars and say that Abdallah Azzam founded the movement. We
could possibly say that Abdallah Azzam helped to found the movement,
but the real founder was Shaykh Ahmad Yasin.

[Al-Qarni] Perhaps.

[Al-Dhiyabi] Was the Egyptian Al-Jihad Organization strong and prominent in the Afghan arena in those days?

[Al-Qarni] Actually during the Afghan jihad era and up to the time
of Kabul’s fall Al-Jihad Organization did not have any roots in the
arena of jihad. It was in a dormant state. Of course its members found
a safe haven in Peshawar because it was an open place. You did not need
a passport or anything of the sort to live there. Any person could go
and live there without anyone asking questions. It was a place full of
immigrants from all over the world. So they found a safe haven there
where they could live with their families and reorganize themselves.
They were not known among themujahidin as active in the camps or on the
battlefronts. They did not lead operations nor had any ties with the
well-known Afghan jihad leaders. In the sphere of education and
advocacy of the faith they were not known at all. Today their most
prominent figure is Al-Zawahiri. He was not well-known in the days of
jihad as he is now. The most prominent Al-Jihad Organization figure was
a man they called DrFadl.

[Al-Dhiyabi] Is still he alive?

[Al-Qarni] I asked about him and where he had gone. They told me
that he had emigrated either to Australia or Canada and had completely
abandoned the jihad idea. He left Al-Jihad Organization, abandoned its
ideology, and lived a normal civilian life. Al-Jihad group was not
prominently known in those days. It was in a stage of reorganization.

[Al-Dhiyabi] Were they an organized group? I mean, did their name
exist in that arena as the Egyptian Al-Jihad Organization or were they
under the umbrella of the so-calledjihadist groups or the Arab Afghans?

[Al-Qarni] They were not prominent. They lived there as
individuals. They did not operate as an organized group or a party that
had activities or a group that gave lectures to themujahidin.

   When i heard
the recent speech of President  Bush about the Financial crisis facing America
and recommending a bailout plan of $700 billion, the above quote came to my
mind.His speech is not even believed by his party’s nominee for Nov 2008
election Senator McCain that he joined his opponent senator Obama and issued a
common statement not approving the bailout.Abraham
Lincoln,Roosevelt,Truman,Kennedy  all had that aura of Truth around them while
we know Johnson,Nixon,Clinton and now Bush have reduced that aura of Truth
around American presidency.
   When Bush told Pakistani Premier Gilanni that
Pakistan’s territorial integrity will be respected EVEN as the American special
forces were inside FATA conducting an operation.He should have told him the
truth and faced its consequences.American media also are culpable to a large
extant in this creation of lie into truth business for the sake of their
Presidency. When he told Indian PM in 2005 about making India a nuke power
without need to sign the NPT, now he is coming out that his promises to Indian
PM were just "political promises".Of course Iraq and WMD and now recently his
warning to Iran and the bluff was called by Iranian President."Talk softly but
carry a big stick", was the advise given by an earlier president but Bush has
not learnt this  important lesson.
     Why is it important for American
president to speak the truth or keep QUIET when posed uncomfortable
questions.
    1.He is the most powerful human being on earth leading the
richest nation on earth and commanding the most powerful army on earth.If this
human cannot speak truth without fear
of its consequences, then which other
human can?
   2 It is also morally important for American President to speak
truth because he is also perceived as leader of a Christian nation.Nobody thinks
about Pope Benedict when they talk about Christian leaders.Normally it is the
American president who is perceived as a christian leader of the west by third
world countries.
   Even in India we have this aura around Laloo Prasad
yadav,Priyanka Gandhi and Arun Shouri but not very many other politicians while
in tinsel world  Preity Zinta has this aura  about her.
   Does Obama or
McCain have this aura? It is for the American people  who elect  their leader to find  the 
man who speaks TRUTH AND READY TO FACE ITS CONSEQUENCES SHOULD BE AN IMPORTANT
CRITERIA FOR THIS ELECTION IN NOVEMEBER 2008.
]]> http://captainjohann.wordpress.com/2008/09/27/american-presidents-do-not-lie/feed/ 0 captainjohann http://captainjohann.wordpress.com/2008/06/19/the-pope-and-the-jehadies/ http://captainjohann.wordpress.com/2008/06/19/the-pope-and-the-jehadies/#comments Thu, 19 Jun 2008 12:25:11 +0000 captainjohann http://captainjohann.wordpress.com/?p=3 ]]>  Pope Bendict is the head of Catholic Church. Is he spreading the message of love or is he a  politician who is playing the neocon agenda is  the question .

     His behaviour is so different from his predecessor that he does not look or behave  like a man of god.

His opening the old controversy of emperor Augustine’s remarks about Islam. 

It did not help in healing  the festering relations between Christianity

and Islam. His Easter eve conversion of an Egyptian Allam from Islam into Christianity is provocative and 

                            stand in contrast with conversion of Tony Blair from protestant church to Catholicism done in a quiet way.

    Now suddenly we find the Danish cartoonist’s cartoons are reappearing

    Of course the film Firnia by dutch parliamentarian does not help in creating brotherhood.

    Why these things are being done and why immediately there is return comments from jihadies in south

asia calling for the head of the cartoonist,street protests etc. Why these things are done?

Pope  made it compulsory to have LATIN WORSHIP ONLY reversing Pope paul’s ruling. According to him his Christian

God only understood LATIN! Islam’s almighty Allah can understand only Arabic, as was the case with Hindu gods

who understand only  Sanskrit as also Sikh gods who hear only Punjabi in gurmukhi script!!!

    It is the duty of RELIGIOUS LEADERS AND SCHOLARS TO bring peace and understanding amongst

the world’s  religions though they can worship their OWN  gods in Mosques and churches and temples.

What we see is Pope is playing the game of provocation along with neocons while Jehadies

have to retaliate immediately in kind and violence. This suits the agenda of people who are interested

in creating rift amongst nations and peoples.

     There was no CHRISTIAN GOD BEFORE 2008 YEARS. There was no ALMIGHTY ALLAH BEFORE 1500 YEARS

 I do not know the age of Jewish and Hindu gods. We all know that Greeks/Romans worshipped Zeus,

diana,Herod etc etc. They do not exist now. What will happen to those ancient humans who lived before

let us say 2000 years back who did not have the benefit of teachings of Christ and Prophet Mohamed?

How they are going to be judged? By actions some say? But how the morality of actions will be judged?

      To me Pope and Jehadies have a common agenda of creating enmity amongst people and not love and

brotherhood. Increased arm sales,increased bomb detection equipment,TV scanners,metal detectors and whole lot

of security related equipment. It is to me similar to computer Viruses created by the very firms who sell us

anti/virus protection and scanning for Trojan horses/malware etc..